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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
VOTER IDEOLOGY, TAX EXPORTING, AND STATE AND LOCAL TAX 
STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
State and local governments play an important role in financing and delivering public 
services in the United States.  In 2008, state and local governments collected 57 percent 
of total federal, state, and local revenue (Urban Institute and Brookings Institution, Tax 
Policy Center, 2009).  The decentralization of fiscal responsibility has enabled a high 
degree of variation in state and local tax structures to emerge.  This dissertation presents 
two empirical studies that extend the positive literature on state and local tax policy.   
 
The extant literature contains evidence of a direct relationship between voter ideology 
and state and local tax progressivity.  However, the measures of voter ideology that were 
used either did not capture differences in the intensity of voter liberalism across states, 
did not vary over time, or were beset with other limitations.  This study uses the measure 
of average voter liberalism developed by Berry et al (1998).  I find that average voter 
liberalism is significantly and positively-related to progressivity.  However, the effect is 
small in magnitude.   The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor is 
positively-related to progressivity and the effects are economically significant.  The 
degree of tension between ethnic groups, measured with an index of ethnic residential 
segregation, is significantly and inversely-related to progressivity.  Both variables are 
statistically significant even with average voter liberalism held constant.  It is possible 
that the ethnic demographic context reflects aspects of voters’ redistributive preferences 
that are not captured by measures of ideology. 
 
Researchers have found relationships between states’ tax exporting capacities and the tax 
structures they adopt.   Chapter 4 is the first study to examine the relationship between 
state tax exporting capacities and the business sales taxes.  I find that the effective sales 
tax rate that governments impose on business purchases is not significantly influenced by 
a state’s capacity to export business taxes.  It is, however, significantly and positively 
affected by a state’s ability to export taxes on households through the deductibility of 
state and local taxes under the federal income tax.  A decrease in this offset is predicted to 
 
 
lead to an increase in the effective business sales tax rate, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS:  State and local public finance; tax progressivity; ideology; sales tax; tax 
exporting          
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 In the United States, the provision of public services and taxing power is divided 
between the federal, state, and local governments.  The decentralization of taxation has 
facilitated a high degree of variation in tax structures among states.  In 2007, state and 
local governments derived 22 percent of their tax revenue from the personal income tax 
and 23 percent from the general sales tax (see Table 1.2).   However, state and local 
governments in 11 states obtained more than 30 percent of their revenue from the sales tax 
and less than 20 percent from the income tax.  Four states derived less than 1 percent of 
tax revenue from the sales tax.1  There is also significant variation in the share of tax 
revenue derived from the property tax.  The standard deviation of the property tax share of 
tax revenue was equal to about thirty-one percent of the mean in 2007.        
 These differences in state and local tax structures lead to significant differences in 
the distribution of tax burdens across income groups.  One way to measure the 
progressivity of state and local tax structures is examine the average tax rate facing a 
state's top income quintile as a percentage of the average tax rate facing the bottom 
quintile (Top-to-Bottom %).  Table 1.1 reports the Top-to-Bottom % for each of the 48 
contiguous states in 2007 along with each state's rank according to that measure.   We see 
that there is considerable variation in the progressivity of state and local tax structures.  In 
2007, the most progressive state (New York) was three times as progressive as the least 
(Washington).  The progressivity of state and local tax structures in terms of annual 
income is determined by reliance on income taxes relative to consumption and property 
taxes as well as the structure of the income tax that is utilized.  The states with the most 
progressive tax systems are those which rely heavily on the personal income tax.  Among 
                                               
1Author's calculations from Census of Governments data. 
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the ten most progressive states, the average income tax share of tax revenue was about 
twenty-nine percent in 2007, which is about one standard deviation above the mean for 
that year.  Among the ten most regressive states, the average income tax share of tax 
revenue was equal to about four percent, which is about one and a half standard deviations 
below the mean.  Among states that utilize the personal income tax, those with the most 
progressive income tax systems have a relatively large number of tax brackets, impose 
relatively high marginal tax rates on the top income bracket, and utilize low-income tax 
credits.  The exemption of food from the sales tax tends to reduce the regressivity of the 
sales tax.2 
 State and local taxes potentially influence the efficiency with which resources are 
allocated.  Economists have found evidence that suggests that state and local tax policies 
influence household and business location decisions, among other economic choices.3  
Because of the economic significance of state and local taxation, the study of state and 
local tax policy from a political economy standpoint is an important enterprise.   
 The determination of tax structure requires state and local policymakers to make 
tradeoffs between efficiency, equity, and the potential political benefits from tax exporting 
and the use of hidden taxes.  The variation in state and local tax structures may be driven 
by variation in voter ideology.  The facilitation of such a relationship is often viewed as 
one of the benefits of fiscal decentralization.  However, subnational tax structures may 
also be influenced by tax exporting capacities.  Perturbations in these parameters may lead 
to adjustments in state and local tax structures that have significant effects on the 
efficiency and equity with which subnational public services are financed. If we wish to 
                                               
2 See the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2009). 
3See Coomes and Hoyt (2008) and Chernick (2010) for reviews of the literature. 
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predict the adjustments that are likely to take place, then it is necessary to estimate 
comprehensive empirical models of the determination of state and local tax structures.  
The two empirical studies presented here contribute to the positive literature on state and 
local tax policy.  Both studies draw from the political science literatures on state and local 
American politics and the empirical economics literatures on tax exporting and tax 
competition.    
Organization of the Dissertation 
 Following this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the positive literature on state and 
local tax structure, which has sought to answer the following questions: (1) what 
determines the tax rates that state and local governments levy on particular bases?; (2) 
what political and economic factors determine the mix of state and local taxes (e.g. how 
much revenue governments draw from the income tax relative to the sales tax)?  The 
literature has not provided definitive answers concerning the impact of voter ideology on 
state and local tax structure.  It has also provided limited information concerning the 
determinants of business tax levies.   
 Using estimates of state and local tax burdens by income group, Chapter 3 
examines the relationship between voter ideology and state and local tax progressivity.  It 
is not the first study to do so.  However, past studies on state and local tax progressivity 
used measures of voter ideology that either did not capture change in the electorate’s 
ideological orientation over time, or they did not reflect differences in the intensity of an 
electorate’s liberalism, or they were characterized by other limitations.  This study uses the 
measure of average voter liberalism developed by Berry et al (1998).  The impact of 
average voter liberalism was estimated using a generalized method of moments (GMM) 
model that included measures of state demographics, tax exporting capacities, voting 
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institutions, and the tax progressivity of neighboring states.  I find that average voter 
liberalism is significantly and positively-related to state and local tax progressivity.  
However, the effect is small in magnitude.  The ethnic congruence between the poor and 
the non-poor is positively-related to progressivity and the effects are economically 
significant, even with average voter liberalism held constant.  Thus, it appears that the 
weight that the non-poor place on the well-being of the poor is substantially influenced by 
ethnic group loyalty.  The degree of tension between ethnic groups, measured with an 
index of ethnic residential segregation, is significantly and inversely-related to 
progressivity even with average voter liberalism held constant.  It is possible that ethnic 
homogeneity and the amiability of ethnic group relations reflect components of voter 
preferences that are not captured by measures of general voter ideology.  This study is the 
first to examine the relationship between ethnic residential segregation and state and local 
tax progressivity. 
 Chapter 4 estimates the impacts of state tax exporting capacities on state and local 
sales taxes (with local sales taxes aggregated to the state level) on business input 
purchases and consumer purchases separately. It is the first to examine the relationship 
between state tax exporting capacities and business sales taxes, which are the second-
largest component of subnational business tax levies, behind property taxes.  Like the 
study presented in Chapter 3, the analysis involves the estimation of a multivariate GMM 
model.  The existing literature suggests that broad measures of sales tax burdens such as 
effective sales tax rates and the sales tax’s share of state government revenue are 
significantly affected by tax exporting capacities.  This study was carried out to determine 
whether the influence of tax exporting capacities extends to the levies imposed on the 
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components of the sales tax base.  I find that the effective sales tax rate that governments 
impose on business purchases is not significantly influenced by a state’s capacity to export 
business taxes.  It is, however, significantly and positively affected by a state’s ability to 
export taxes on households through the deductibility of state and local taxes under the 
federal income tax.  A decrease in the offset provided by the federal deduction is predicted 
to lead to an increase in the effective business sales tax rate, ceteris paribus.  The estimates 
presented here suggest that the elimination of the deductibility of personal taxes under the 
federal income tax is likely to prompt state and local governments to shift reliance from 
relatively-visible personal taxes to less visible sales taxes on firms.  The deductibility 
offset for personal taxes does not appear to be significantly related to consumer sales tax 
levies.  The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor is positively-related to 
producer sales tax levies but does not appear to be significantly-related to consumer sales 
tax levies. Support for public spending may be lower in states that are ethnically 
heterogeneous.  As a result, governments may rely more heavily on hidden taxes such as 
the sales tax on business inputs.  Finally, Chapter 5 has a discussion of the findings, a 
summary of the dissertation, conclusions, limitations, implications, and recommendations 
for future research. 
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Table 1.1: State and Local Tax Progressivity across the 48 Contiguous States, 2007 
 
States Top-to-Bottom % Rank 
New York 113.9 1 
Vermont 108.6 2 
South Carolina 106.6 3 
Wisconsin 103.9 4 
Maine 102 5 
Delaware 99.5 6 
Oregon 97.7 7 
Montana 97.4 8 
Minnesota 96.7 9 
Idaho 93.7 10 
Kentucky 92.9 11 
North Carolina 92.2 12 
Kansas 91.1 13 
California 91.1 14 
Maryland 89.6 15 
Michigan 89.2 16 
New Jersey 89 17 
West Virginia 87.2 18 
Virginia 85.6 19 
Missouri 82.8 20 
Iowa 81.7 21 
Nebraska 77.3 22 
Ohio 76.4 23 
Utah 76.2 24 
Massachusetts 75.7 25 
Rhode Island 75.1 26 
Georgia 71.2 27 
Mississippi 70.9 28 
Arkansas 70.7 29 
Colorado 69.9 30 
Connecticut 69.1 31 
Oklahoma 68.7 32 
Indiana 66 33 
New Mexico 65.5 34 
Louisiana 65.2 35 
North Dakota 63.1 36 
Pennsylvania 61.1 37 
Alabama 60.6 38 
Illinois 53.5 39 
Arizona 52.4 40 
New Hampshire 51.5 41 
Texas 41.9 42 
Tennessee 40.4 43 
Nevada 39.7 44 
South Dakota 37.6 45 
Wyoming 36.4 46 
Florida 32.4 47 
Washington 31.3 48 
Mean (std. dev.) 74.8 (29.1)  
      Source: Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2009) 
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Table 1.2: Tax Structure Characteristics of the 48 Contiguous States, 2007 
 
States Inc Tax Share of Tax Rev. Sales Tax Share of Tax Rev. Prop Tax Share of Tax Rev. Rank 
New York 31.84 16.41 28.41 1 
Vermont 19.81 11.59 42.16 2 
South 
Carolina 23.49 24.31 31.13 3 
Wisconsin 27.15 19.06 36 4 
Maine 25.59 18.37 35.86 5 
Delaware 29.34 0 15.55 6 
Oregon 44.02 0 31.05 7 
Montana 25.46 0 33.84 8 
Minnesota 30.57 19.22 25.85 9 
Idaho 29.54 26.83 23.41 10 
Kentucky 29.49 20.56 18.83 11 
North 
Carolina 32.66 21.95 22.54 12 
Kansas 24.19 26.57 30.47 13 
California 29.65 23.3 27.05 14 
Maryland 39.7 12.74 24.2 15 
Michigan 18.64 21.53 39.19 16 
New Jersey 22.81 16.75 41.78 17 
West Virginia 22.3 18.52 18.63 18 
Virginia 31.63 14.51 30.95 19 
Missouri 26.96 26.02 27.43 20 
Iowa 25.08 21.23 33.08 21 
Nebraska 22.9 24.4 33.03 22 
Ohio 30.08 20.59 29.14 23 
Utah 28.17 28.16 22.42 24 
Massachusetts 35.5 12.69 34.38 25 
Rhode Island 22.69 18.3 41.03 26 
Georgia 26.6 29.88 28.77 27 
Mississippi 15.9 35.79 25.02 28 
Arkansas 23.63 41.28 14.69 29 
Colorado 25.74 27.2 30.4 30 
Connecticut 29.45 14.09 37.51 31 
Oklahoma 23.48 28.81 16.34 32 
Indiana 24.48 25.44 28.94 33 
New Mexico 15.81 36.08 13.54 34 
Louisiana 18.27 40.05 14.84 35 
North Dakota 12.2 21.95 26.87 36 
Pennsylvania 26.17 17.21 28.63 37 
Alabama 23.21 29.75 15.49 38 
Illinois 17.09 16.64 37.14 39 
Arizona 16.06 40.14 26.67 40 
New 
Hampshire 2.27 0 61.4 41 
Texas 0 30.86 41.69 42 
Tennessee 1.33 46.64 24.04 43 
Nevada 0 33.83 27.53 44 
South Dakota 0 40.56 34.26 45 
Wyoming 0 28.32 36.87 46 
Florida 0 33.16 36.79 47 
Washington 0 47.51 26.76 48 
Mean(StDev) 21.47 (11.17) 23.51 (11.41) 29.4 (9.07)  
 
Copyright © John M. Foster 2012 
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Chapter 2: Voter Ideology, Fiscal Federalism, and State and Local Tax Structure 
Introduction  
 This chapter reviews three empirical literatures that are relevant for the research 
presented in later chapters.  The literatures examined are the political science literature on 
the influence of ideology on state and local tax progressivity and the tax exporting and tax 
competition literatures from economics.  These literatures also comprise the bulk of the 
positive empirical analysis of state and local tax policy determination that has been 
conducted.  The chapter is organized as follows: Section I describes the theoretical 
frameworks that have been used in these studies.  Section II reviews studies that examine 
the relationship between state and local tax progressivity and voter ideology.  Sections III 
and IV summarize the empirical literatures on tax exporting and tax competition, 
respectively.  Section V describes the extensions to the empirical literature provided by 
this dissertation. 
Theoretical Frameworks 
 Governments utilize multiple tax instruments.  The choice of tax rates, or the tax 
structure, influences the allocation of resources and the distribution of after-tax income. 
Economists and political scientists have long been interested in developing predictive 
models of government behavior.  The motivations of legislators have been modeled in 
different ways.  Whether the model posits that legislators intend to maximize revenue, the 
utility of the representative citizen, or expected political support, governments may be 
influenced by the ideological preferences of their constituents.  However, subnational 
governments must also deal with the constraints and opportunities created by fiscal 
federalism.  Many tax bases are mobile among jurisdictions.  Consequently, a tax imposed 
by a particular jurisdiction may affect the size of its tax bases.  Because of interstate 
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commerce, tax bases often overlap jurisdictions.  For example, a portion of the 
consumption expenditures that are made in a state consists of purchases made by 
nonresidents.  The fact that jurisdictions share tax bases creates opportunities for tax 
exporting.  The deductibility of certain state and local taxes under the federal income tax 
allows states and localities to export portions of their tax burdens to federal taxpayers.   
Some empirical studies in the tax exporting and tax competition literatures are 
based on models in which the government chooses the fiscal platform that maximizes the 
utility of a representative citizen.4  The basis of these models is the conception of the 
government as a benevolent, omniscient social planner.  With perfect information and 
benevolent intentions, the government chooses the tax structure that maximizes the 
representative citizen’s utility.  The parameters that may influence the choice of the tax 
rate(s) are the characteristics of the representative citizen, such as her income, income 
sources, and ideological preferences, as well as the characteristics of the economic 
environment such as tax exporting capacities and the tax rates levied by competing states.  
The notion of government as a benevolent maximizer of the representative citizen's utility 
is at odds with the models of self-interested agents that are common in positive economic 
theory.   
Economists studying public policy from a positive perspective have attempted to 
develop models that conceive of policymakers as being self-interested agents who 
maximize their own utility (or some variable related to their utility) subject to institutional 
                                               
4In the tax exporting literature, see Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) and Metcalf (1993).  In the tax competition 
literature, see Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and Rork (2003).  Gade and Adkins’s (1990) study of tax 
exporting models the government at using the most cost-effective tax structure (in terms of taking advantage 
of tax exporting opportunities and holding down deadweight losses and administrative costs) that raises the 
revenue desired by the median voter.  The theoretical model provides little insight on what forces motivate 
the government to use the tax structure that is optimal at least at the level of the jurisdiction. 
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constraints.  Brennan and Buchanan (1980) develop a positive and normative theory of 
public finance that is based on the assumption that the government is a revenue-
maximizer.  Traditional public finance is based on the assumption that the government is a 
benevolent, utility-maximizer.  Under the traditional approach, the government can 
minimize excess burden imposed by a given level of revenue by following the inverse-
elasticity rule (i.e. the Ramsey rule).  A revenue-maximizing government would also 
follow the inverse-elasticity rule but spending may exceed the Pareto optimal level.  
Because of rational ignorance among voters and possible collusion between parties, 
political competition may leave a revenue-maximizing government with a great deal of 
slack.  If citizens believe that they will be limited in their ability to control a revenue-
maximizing government in the post-constitutional period, they may rationally include 
constraints on the government’s taxing power in the constitution.  There are three possible 
constraints: constraints on tax rates, allowable tax bases, and constraints imposed by 
decentralization, which increases interjurisdictional competition.  Though the use of 
narrow tax bases allows for substitution away from taxation and thus excess burden, 
citizens may rationally include provisions for narrow tax bases in order to limit excessive 
government spending. At the constitutional stage, citizens choose the tax bases that are 
likely to provide sufficient revenue to finance the desired level of public services.  The 
level of public services that citizens desire is determined by the excess burden of the tax 
instruments employed and the proportion of revenue that citizens expect the government 
to actually spend on the provision of services (i.e. the proportion that is not withheld as 
pure surplus).  Citizens can increase the proportion of revenue devoted to the provision of 
public goods and services by choosing tax bases that depend on the provision of public 
11 
 
goods and services.  An example would be taxes on motor fuels and automobile purchases.  
Citizens will engage in those taxable activities to the extent that their government builds 
and maintains roads. Thus, the government has an incentive to divert a larger proportion of 
revenue to public good provision since it promotes taxable activities. 
Nelson (1986) tests the Leviathan theory using cross-sectional data on state 
government tax structures.5  He finds that the presence of a state corporation income tax is 
negatively related to state revenue as a share of state personal income.  The corporation 
income tax may limit Leviathan governments since increasing the tax burden on 
corporations may cause them to relocate.  This would reduce the government’s tax base.  
Nelson also finds that broad-based personal income and general sales taxes are positively 
related to revenue.  For the personal income tax, broadness is characterized by the 
inclusion of labor and investment income.  Broad sales tax bases are characterized by the 
taxation of a substantial number of services.  These results suggest that it may be rational 
for citizens to constrain their governments to tax narrow bases if they believe that political 
competition does not effectively constrain government fiscal behavior.  Kau and Rubin 
(1981) obtain theoretical and empirical results that are analogous to the Leviathan model.  
The authors assume that governments are revenue maximizers and hypothesize that the 
growth in the size of government that occurred in the 20th century can be attributed to 
changes in economic activity, such as the shift away from self-employment and the shift of 
women from home production into market production, which increased the size of tax 
bases, like wage income, that are relatively easy for the government to tax.   
                                               
5Most empirical tests of the Leviathan model examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
tax, expenditure, and debt limitations on government size.  See Mueller (2003, 380-383) for a discussion of 
the empirical literature. 
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Boardman (2002) examines the relationship between state sales tax base coverage 
and rates to determine whether state governments tend to maximize residents’ utility or 
revenues.  If the government’s objective is to maximize the utility of the representative 
resident, then an increase in the coverage of a tax base should be accompanied by a 
perfectly offsetting reduction in the tax rate.  In other words, an increase in the coverage of 
a tax base should be revenue-neutral.  However, if the government seeks to maximize 
revenue, then an increase in the coverage of the tax base is unlikely to be accompanied by 
a perfectly offsetting tax rate reduction.  That is, an increase in base coverage could lead to 
a higher level of government spending.  Using a state-level panel dataset, Boardman finds 
that sales tax base coverage and the sales tax rate tend to be inversely-related, but the 
relationship does not lead to revenue-neutral adjustments.  States with broader sales tax 
base coverage tend to spend more.  Boardman’s study provides evidence against the 
conception of government as a utility maximizer but it does not provide definitive 
evidence on what governments’ objective(s) actually are.  Governments may raise 
additional revenue from a broader sales tax base to buy the support of active constituent 
groups.  Electoral competition is not a stringent constraint in the Leviathan model, but the 
probabilistic voter model proceeds from the assumption that fiscal policy platforms are 
selected by office-motivated politicians.  In this model, the primary goal of parties or 
candidates is to maximize expected political support. 
The probabilistic voting model was developed in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.6  
In this model, two office-motivated candidates simultaneously and noncooperatively make 
binding policy commitments and voters choose the candidate whose policy platform gives 
                                               
6See Mueller (2003, 249-263) for a review of the literature. 
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them the highest utility. The candidates know how each feasible platform affects the utility 
of each voter but they are uncertain about how the voting behavior of each voter will be 
affected by different platforms.  For example, the candidates know how an increase in a 
particular tax rate will affect middle class voters.  What they do not know for certain is 
how this tax increase will affect the number of the votes that they receive from these 
voters.  Each candidate chooses the platform that maximizes the probability of winning.  
Hettich and Winer’s (1999) application of the probabilistic voting model to the 
determination of tax policy has been the most frequently used theoretical framework in the 
empirical literatures.  In a tax policy context, each candidate chooses each tax rate so that 
the marginal loss in expected political support is equal to the marginal gain from public 
spending and the marginal loss of support from each tax is equal.  A government can 
potentially obtain greater support by shifting tax burdens to non-residents and being 
attentive to the ideological orientation of voters as well as the tax structures of competing 
jurisdictions.   
In equilibrium, the weight that a particular voter’s welfare receives has been shown 
to depend on the extent to which that voter is biased in favor of a particular candidate, 
whether he or she is a member of an organized interest group, and on the size of that 
group.7   All else equal, larger groups should be more influential than smaller groups.  
Organized interest groups that make campaign contributions should be more influential 
                                               
7Coughlin, Mueller, and Murrell (1990) present a formal model in which the weight that a particular interest 
group receives depends on the number of votes that it can be expected to deliver in response to preferential 
treatment.  Hettich and Winer (1999) extend this model to explain the determination of tax structure.  The 
influence of a particular interest group increases if that group becomes more ideologically homogeneous or 
less biased in favor of a particular candidate or party.  In Persson and Tabellini (2000), organized groups 
make campaign contributions that are used for political advertising.  In equilibrium, the weight that a 
particular group receives depends on its share of the population and on the marginal effect of political 
advertising on the candidate’s expected vote share. 
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than non-contributing interest groups of the same size.  Voter groups that are strongly 
biased in favor of a particular candidate or party concerning a non-fiscal issue, such as an 
issue concerning religion or race, are predicted to receive less consideration from 
candidates when they choose their fiscal platforms. Voter groups that have more swing 
voters, or voters who are not biased in favor of a particular candidate or party and who 
care only about fiscal policy, are predicted to receive more consideration. 
The utility maximization, Leviathan, and probabilistic voting models all predict 
that governments are likely to take advantage of tax exporting opportunities and are likely 
to be responsive to citizen ideology and to the tax rates imposed by competing states.  
Estimating the impacts of voter ideology, tax exporting, and tax competition on state and 
local tax structure will not enable us to distinguish utility maximizing behavior among 
governments from revenue or political support maximization.    
The Role of Ideology 
 Conventional public finance theory posits that redistribution should be carried out 
primarily by the federal government for two reasons: first, there may be national spillovers 
in the benefits for altruistic voters; second, redistribution carried out at the state or local 
level could prompt the in-migration of poor households and out-migration of the rich.8  
Some states have complemented the progressive federal income tax with progressive tax 
systems of their own.  This is untrue of most states.  On average, low-income households 
pay a larger share of their income in state and local taxes than wealthy households.  In 
other words, state and local tax systems tend to be regressive.  Variation in state and local 
tax structures may be driven to some extent by voters’ ideological orientations.  Whether 
                                               
8  See Tresch (2002, 832-928) for a review of the theoretical literature on fiscal federalism. 
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governments wish to maximize the representative voter’s utility or maximize expected 
political support, they are likely to be attentive to the distribution of ideological 
preferences.  A relationship between tax progressivity and citizen ideology may be 
observed even if political competition does not preclude shirking by legislators.  If the tax 
structure deviates from citizens’ values beyond a certain degree, ignorance ceases to be 
rational and incumbents may be thrown out of office.  Thus, a statistically-significant 
relationship between voter ideology and tax progressivity is consistent with the Leviathan 
model. 
 Political scientists and economists have examined the relationship between state 
and local tax progressivity and measures of the average voter’s ideology.  There are at 
least five measures of the average voter’s ideology in the political science and economics 
literatures.  Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) pool survey data across numerous years 
to obtain state-representative samples.  The authors measured average citizen liberalism in 
each state with the percentage of respondents who identified themselves as liberals.  The 
authors estimated the relationship between their measure of citizen liberalism and state 
and local tax progressivity, among other policy variables.  They found that the percentage 
of voters identifying as liberal is positively-related to state and local tax progressivity.  
There are three significant limitations to the validity of the Erikson, Wright, and McIver 
(1993) measure of average voter liberalism.  Because the authors obtained representative 
state samples by pooling many years of surveys, the measure does not change over time.  
Another limitation of the measure is that it does not capture differences in the intensity of 
a respondent’s liberalism.  Respondents are not permitted to indicate how liberal or 
conservative they are.  Another potential problem is that ideological self-identification 
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may not map consistently into policy preferences.  According to Stimson (1991), “the 
symbols, personalities, ideas, and images underlying ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ include 
much content that is other than prescriptions for public policy” (Stimson 1991, 61).  Thus, 
the Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) measure may be a weak measure of operational 
ideology, or the kinds of policies that citizens prefer.   
 Chernick (1992) measures average voter liberalism with the average AFL-CIO 
rating of state assemblies.  An important limitation of the measure used by Chernick 
(1992) is that it only gauges the ideological orientation of the citizens who voted for the 
winning candidates.  He finds that this measure is positively-related to state and local tax 
progressivity.  Morgan (1995) uses Holbrook-Provow and Poe’s (1987) measure of general 
voter conservatism.  The measure is the average Conservative Coalition score for the 
state’s congressional delegation.  Morgan finds that the ideology measure is inversely-
related to state and local tax progressivity.  Like the measure used by Chernick (1992), the 
Holbrook-Provow and Poe (1987) measure does not take the preferences of those who 
voted for the opposition into account.  These measures are closer approximations of the 
ideologies of governments than of electorates. 
Fletcher and Murray (2008) measure citizens’ tastes for redistribution with the share of 
votes received by Al Gore in 2000 and with the United Way’s State of Caring Index, which 
is a composite measure that includes several variables associated with charitable activity.  
The former measure is problematic since it does not capture differences in the intensity of 
liberal ideology among different electorates.  The constructive validity of the latter 
measure is limited because government redistributive policies and private charity may be 
substitutes.  These ideology measures were statistically insignificant.  The analysis 
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presented in the next chapter will estimate the relationship between average voter 
liberalism and state and local tax progressivity using a more constructively valid measure 
of average voter liberalism.   
Voters may balance their ideological preferences against their narrow financial self-
interests.  As a result, legislators may be able to gain political support by taking advantage 
of tax exporting opportunities. 
Tax Exporting 
 Tax exporting occurs when a portion of a jurisdiction's tax burden is shifted to 
nonresidents through federal tax deductibility provisions or inter-jurisdictional commerce 
and investment.  The deductibility of state and local taxes under the federal income tax 
provides states and localities with an ample opportunity to shift the costs of subnational 
government to the national level.  The deduction subsidizes the use of deductible tax 
instruments.  State and local general sales taxes were deductible along with income and 
property taxes until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which repealed sales tax deductibility.  
The 2004 American Jobs Creation Act authorized deductibility of sales taxes in lieu of 
income taxes, meaning that taxpayers can deduct either income or sales taxes, but not 
both.  Corporations and proprietors can deduct state and local tax burdens that constitute 
normal business expenses under the federal corporate and personal income taxes, 
respectively.  States can also export taxes by levying taxes on firms that sell goods outside 
of the state and perhaps have nonresident investors.  States with natural resources such as 
fuel and precious metals can potentially shift portions of business tax burdens to 
nonresident consumers as well as to nonresident investors in those industries.  The ability 
of states to export taxes on natural resources to consumers depends on whether it 
dominates the market.  If the state’s natural resource industries do not dominate their 
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markets then most of the exporting will be backwards to out-of-state investors (McLure 
1967; Gade and Adkins 1990).  The portion that is not borne by capital will most likely be 
divided between in-state workers and land owners.  The presence of amenities like 
beaches or mountains may draw tourists whose consumption can be taxed.     
 A certain degree of tax exporting is sensible since nonresidents who benefit from a 
particular jurisdiction’s should pay tax prices that equal the marginal costs of the services 
from which they benefit.  Tourists utilize infrastructure, public safety, and other services 
when they visit a jurisdiction.  However, politicians may use taxes that fall at least 
partially on nonresidents to cross-subsidize a broad range of services, including those that 
mainly benefit residents.  McLure (1967) argues that tax exporting may lead to 
overprovision of subnational public services since it lowers the cost of public spending 
relative to private spending.  This perspective was challenged by Mieszkowski and Toder 
(1983).  The authors consider a model in which local governments maximize the revenue 
derived from exporting. If the desired level of spending can be fully supported by that 
revenue, no increase in the size of the public sector will follow from exporting. If, 
however, the demand for public goods is higher than that supported by exported taxes, the 
incremental services must be financed solely by resident taxpayers and there is no increase 
in government size. Wildasin (1987) generalizes that model and concludes that 
government size may be stimulated in some instances by tax exporting, but that is not 
generally the case.  Even if tax exporting does not affect the size of the subnational sector, 
it is likely to influence state and local tax structure. 
 Governments wishing to maximize political support have an obvious incentive to 
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shift portions of the tax burden onto nonresidents.9  An omniscient, benevolent social 
planner seeking to maximize the utility of a subnational jurisdiction’s representative 
resident would also take advantage of tax exporting opportunities.  A Leviathan 
government would rely more heavily on taxes that are deductible under federal personal 
and corporate income taxes.  This is because the federal offset reduces the responsiveness 
of the tax base to the subnational tax.  Reliance on nondeductible tax instruments would 
most likely be driven primarily by relative elasticities and the tax rates levied by 
competing jurisdictions.10     
 Researchers have examined the influence of tax exporting on state and local tax 
structures by developing measures of tax exporting capacities and estimating the effects of 
those capacities on various state and local tax rates or on the shares of various tax 
instruments in state and local revenues.  The size of the offset provided by federal 
deductibility is typically measured with the jurisdiction’s average net-of-federal tax price 
of a dollar paid to a deductible tax.  The net-of-federal tax price of a particular tax 
instrument is given by 
P=1-pm          (2.1) 
where p is the proportion of taxpayers who itemize and m is the average marginal federal 
tax rate facing itemizers in each state.  Six states permit deduction of federal income tax 
paid on the state income tax.  Metcalf (1993) presents a formula for the state average net-
                                               
9Wildasin (1987) provides insights on the extent to a which a government is likely to rely on a tax that falls 
on both residents and nonresidents.  In the theoretical model, an omniscient, benevolent government taxes 
two commodities: one which is consumed entirely by residents and another which is consumed by both 
residents and non-residents.  Wildasin shows that the pair of tax rates that maximizes the representative 
citizen’s utility equalizes the marginal economic cost of each tax. 
10Tax rates may be pushed below their revenue-maximizing levels by interjurisdictional competition.  
Crowley and Sobel (2011) find that municipalities and county governments tend to levy tax rates that fall 
well below the revenue-maximizing rates. 
 
20 
 
of-federal tax price that takes the deductibility of federal income tax paid under the state 
income tax into account.  For itemizers in these states, the tax price is given by 
                                                  (2.2)                                                          
with Tf equaling the marginal federal income tax rate and Ts equaling the marginal state 
income tax rate.   Since the inception of the federal income tax, the average net-of-federal 
tax prices for the income and property taxes have been given by equation (2.1) in states 
that do not allow deductibility of federal income taxes under their state income taxes and 
by (2.2) in states that do.  Because state and local sales taxes were not deductible from 
1987 to 2003, the cost of $1 paid in state and local sales taxes was $1.  Over time and 
between states, the net-of-federal price of a deductible tax decreases with the average 
marginal federal income tax rate faced by itemizers and with the proportion of taxpayers 
who itemize.  The net-of-federal tax price of a deductible tax is also reduced by the 
deductibility of the federal income tax under a state income tax.    
 One would expect reliance on a particular tax instrument to be increasing in its 
own exportability and decreasing in the exportability of alternative instruments.  Lindsay 
(1987) found that the net-of-federal tax price of deductible revenues is inversely-related 
to income tax revenue per capita, but insignificantly-related to the use of sales and 
property taxes by state and local governments.  Gade and Adkins (1990) find that the net-
of-federal price of the income tax is inversely-related to the share of state own-tax 
revenue constituted by the income tax.  The income tax price is positively-related to use 
of the sales tax. Sales tax price is inversely-related to use of the sales tax but is not 
significantly related to income tax reliance. Metcalf (1993) find that the net-of-federal tax 
price of the income tax is negatively-related to use of the income tax.  Unlike Gade and 
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Adkins (1990), he finds no significant relationship between income tax price and use of 
the general sales tax.  He also finds an insignificant relationship between sales tax price 
and use of the general sales tax.  Hettich and Winer (1999) find that the net-of-federal tax 
price is negatively-related to a state’s average income tax rate.  Bahl et al (2002) obtain 
similar results.  Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1990) find that the net-of-federal tax price of the 
property tax is inversely-related to local property tax rates.  Deductibility may also 
influence state and local government use of taxes that are levied on firms and which are 
not deductible by households.  Metcalf (1993) find that the net-of-federal price of the 
income tax is positively-related to the corporate income tax rate.  A decrease (increase) in 
a state’s ability to export personal income taxes appears to prompt states exploit to 
business tax exporting opportunities to a greater (lesser) extent, ceteris paribus.  
However, state and local corporate income taxes constitute a small fraction of subnational 
business tax levies.  In 2008, only 8.5 percent of state and local business tax revenue 
came from corporate income taxes (Cline et al 2009).  Thus, we are left with little 
information concerning how state and local business tax levies may change in response to 
changes in the offsets provided under the federal personal income tax.  None of studies 
discussed here include a proxy for the extent to which a state benefits from deductibility 
of state and local taxes on firms under the federal corporate and personal income taxes.    
Because of the potential exportability of taxes on natural resource firms, states in 
which natural resource industries are relatively prominent may rely relatively heavily on 
severance, corporate income, and property taxes and less heavily on taxes that are borne 
primarily by residents (i.e. personal income taxes and sales taxes on consumer goods), all 
else equal.  One would also expect a larger share of sales tax revenue to be garnered from 
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business input purchases, ceteris paribus.  Gade and Adkins (1990) find that the mining 
share of state personal income is inversely-related to personal income and sales tax 
reliance but positively-related to taxes on motor fuels and other selective sales taxes.  
Hettich and Winer (1999) find that the mining share of state income is inversely-related to 
income tax rates.   
 A state in which tourism constitutes a large share of economic activity may rely 
more heavily on sales and excise taxes and license fees than other states since nonresident 
consumption takes up large shares of those bases.  Gade and Adkins (1990) find that the 
prominence of tourism in a state’s economy is inversely-related to income and sales tax 
reliance and positively-related to reliance on recreational license fees.  Use of license fees 
may allocate the costs of public services used by tourists onto tourists to a greater degree 
than consumption taxes.  Unlike Gade and Adkins, (1990), Metcalf (1993) find that 
tourism is positively-related to sales tax reliance.  None of the studies discussed here 
include explicit measures of the taxes imported by states.  Tax importing will affect the 
income of residents and may in turn influence tax rates.  However, the proxies for tax 
exporting capacities used in these studies are probably also good proxies for the net 
benefits obtained from tax exporting.  The importing and exporting of taxes do not 
constitute the only dimension of interdependency created by fiscal federalism.  The tax 
rates levied by subnational governments influence the allocation of mobile tax bases such 
as capital across the federation.  The mobility of tax bases at the subnational level may 
promote fiscal competition between jurisdictions.   
Tax Competition 
 The utility maximization, Leviathan, and probabilistic voting models predict that a 
particular jurisdiction should respond to the tax rates levied by competing jurisdictions.  
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When governments tax mobile bases, a particular government’s tax rate on that base 
influences both the private and public consumption of the citizenry (see Wildasin 1987; 
Hoyt 1991).  The jurisdiction’s supply of the mobile base (capital in many models though 
it could be skilled labor) affects private consumption since it is typically a production 
input (e.g. the supply of capital is positively-related to the productivity of labor and thus 
affects wage income).  The marginal revenue for public good provision depends on the 
extent to which taxation erodes available tax bases.   
 If the jurisdiction is large enough to affect the rate of return, then tax competition 
occurs.  The effect of a competing jurisdiction’s tax rate on that of a particular jurisdiction, 
or the sign of the reaction function, has been shown to be theoretically ambiguous (see 
Brueckner and Saveedra 2001;Rork 2003).  Because the political support function 
maximized by candidates in the probabilistic voting model is based on voter utility 
functions, this ambiguous result can be obtained from the probabilistic voting model.  
Deskins and Hill (2010) model tax competition in a Leviathan framework and also obtain 
a reaction function with an ambiguous sign.  Determining the magnitude and direction of 
the effects of tax competition is an empirical exercise.  Tax competition may be driven not 
just by tax base competition but also by the information spillovers provided by the 
coexistence of multiple jurisdictions. Besley and Case (1995) show that voters may use 
the tax rates imposed by neighboring states or by states that are demographically and/or 
economically-similar as yardsticks to measure the efficiency of their own government.  It 
is difficult to empirically distinguish tax base competition from yardstick competition 
(Brueckner 2003). 
Minimizing the political costs of raising revenue or maximizing revenue or 
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citizens’ utility requires elected officials to respond to the tax structures imposed by other 
jurisdictions.  Both Hettich and Winer (1999) and Rork (2003) find that the average 
personal income tax rates of contiguous states are inversely-related to a state’s tax rates.  
Hettich and Winer attribute this finding to the presence of interstate commuting.  States 
with a relatively large number of workers who commute may rely more heavily on the 
income tax since commuting workers can only vote in the states in which they live.  In 
other words, taxing workers who commute from neighboring states is a form of tax 
exporting.  It is important to note that this type of tax exporting is impossible in states that 
have reciprocity agreements with their neighbors.  If a state has a reciprocity agreement 
with a neighboring state, then taxpayers in each state are subject to the state income tax 
administered by their state of residency, even if they earn income in the other state.  
According to Rork and Wagner (2011), fourteen states were part of at least one reciprocity 
agreement in 2003.11  In his 2003 study, Rork attributes the negative sign on the average 
income tax burden of neighboring states to the low mobility of the personal income base.  
He argues that the number of residents who relocate in response to state income tax 
differentials is likely to be insignificant.  By “recognizing the inelastic response of its 
residents, states can recover some of the revenue lost to relocation by simply raising 
personal income tax rates at home” (Rork 2003, 785).  Rork provides a similar explanation 
for the negative sign on the average sales tax burden imposed by neighboring states.  In 
Rork (2003), the coefficient on the average corporate income tax rate imposed by 
                                               
11Coomes and Hoyt (2008) find that movers who locate in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) that 
comprise states without reciprocity agreements are likely to choose the low tax state.  They attribute this 
result to the greater dissimilarity in the tax structures of contiguous states that do not have reciprocity 
agreements. 
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neighbors is positive.  Rork also finds an inverse relationship between the average sales 
tax rates of contiguous states and a state’s sales tax rate.  The coefficients on the average 
corporate income, gasoline, and cigarette tax rates of neighboring states are positive.  
Nelson (2002) finds that a state’s tax rates on cigarettes, beer, liquor, motor fuels, and 
insurance are tend to be positively-affected by those levied by its neighbors.  Brueckner 
and Saavedra (1990) utilize data on Massachusetts local governments and find that a local 
government’s property tax rate is positively-affected by those of neighboring jurisdictions.   
While Rork only looks at tax competition between contiguous states, Hettich and 
Winer also consider tax competition between non-contiguous states.  The authors assumed 
that a state’s closest competitor is the state that is the most similar in terms of income 
inequality.  Presumably, the degree of income inequality reflects the level of economic 
development in a state which is one way to group substitute states.  The authors found a 
positive relationship between the income tax rates of competitor states and that of the 
observed state.  Fletcher and Murray (2006) explore the influence of interstate tax 
competition on state sales tax base coverage.  The authors identify five competitor states 
for each state, based on similar values for measures such as the manufacturing, service, 
and government shares of employment, state personal income, personal income tax share 
of total income, and the percentage of population in poverty, among other variables.  They 
do not detect significant strategic interaction among contiguous states.  Instead, states that 
have similar levels of personal income, poverty, government shares of employment and 
personal income tax burdens tend to engage in strategic interaction in the development of 
their sales tax policies. The estimated slopes of the reaction functions are invariably 
positive.  Estimates of the effects of fiscal competition based on spatial weights matrices 
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which are based on economic or demographic closeness must be interpreted with caution.  
This is because the own-state tax variable, which is the dependent variable in these cases, 
may be correlated with the elements of the weighting matrices (Anselin 2001; Rork and 
Wagner 2012). 
Implications for Research 
 Three empirical literatures have examined the determinants of state and local tax 
structure: studies of the determinants of state and local tax progressivity and the 
economics literatures on tax exporting and tax competition. Political scientists and 
economists have examined the influence of voter ideology on state and local tax 
progressivity.  However, the studies used measures of voter ideology that either did not 
account for change in the electorate’s ideological orientation over time, or they failed to 
account for differences in the intensity of an electorate’s liberalism, or they suffered from 
other limitations.  The next chapter presents an analysis that uses a more constructively-
valid measure of voter ideology. 
 Tax exporting and tax competition may cause state and local tax structures to 
deviate from the tax structures that are consistent with the population’s ideological 
tendencies.  Subnational governments can export tax burdens through federal deductibility 
provisions, by taxing goods purchased by tourists, or by taxing inputs or income of firms 
that sell to nonresident consumers or have nonresident investors.  Economists have 
consistently found that the offset to state and local personal income taxes provided by 
federal deductibility is positively related to state and local income tax reliance.  The 
evidence concerning the effects of federal deductibility on sales and property tax reliance 
is mixed.  It is possible that reliance on a particular tax is increasing in the net-of-federal 
tax price of alternative instruments.  There is some evidence that suggests that the net-of-
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federal tax price of the personal income tax is positively-related to both sales and 
corporate income taxes.  There is evidence that tax exporting opportunities offered by the 
presence of mining industries is inversely-related to the use of income and sales taxes.  
The evidence on the effects of tourism on tax structure is mixed.  Because the tax 
exporting literature has only examined the relationship between tax exporting and the 
corporate income tax, little is known about the effects of tax exporting on subnational 
business tax levies.  None of the studies discussed here include proxies for the benefit that 
a state derives from corporate tax deductibility.  The study presented in Chapter 4 provides 
new insights on the impact of tax exporting and subnational business tax levies by 
utilizing state-level data on state and local sales taxes garnered from business input 
purchases.  Sales taxes on non-labor input purchases constitute the second-largest 
component of subnational business tax levies, behind property taxes.  The study examines 
the impacts of the deductibility provisions of both the federal personal income and 
corporate income taxes along with the impacts of mining and tourism.  Only one previous 
study, Fletcher and Murray (2006), examined the determinants of sales tax levies on firms.  
The authors only examined the determinants of the treatment of manufacturing equipment 
and focused on tax competition. 
 The empirical studies that follow contribute to the positive literature on state and 
local tax structure by answering the following questions.  To what extent is state and local 
tax structure influenced by voter ideology?  What is the direction and magnitude of the 
impact?  Are differences in subnational tax structures driven primarily by ideological 
differences or by differences in tax exporting opportunities and in regional fiscal 
environments?  
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Chapter 3: Voter Ideology, Ethnic Demographics, and State and Local Tax 
Progressivity 
 
As was discussed at length in Chapter 1, there is a high degree of variation in the 
progressivity of state and local tax systems.  Differences in the tax policies adopted by 
governments reflect differences in priorities and economic circumstances.  Policymakers 
have to compete for office.  State and local tax policy, therefore, is likely to be shaped by 
voter preferences, among other factors.  These tax policy preferences of voters are likely 
to be influenced by their ideological orientation.  Past studies on state and local tax 
progressivity have used measures of voter ideology as an explanatory variable but the 
measures may be characterized by significant limitations, which were described in the 
previous chapter.   
The analyses presented in this chapter use the measure of the average voter’s 
liberalism developed by Berry et al (1998).  The analysis utilizes state and local incidence 
data on the 48 contiguous states for 1995, 2002, and 2007.  I find that average voter 
liberalism is positively related to state and local tax progressivity but that the effect is 
small in magnitude.  A state's ethnic demographic context has statistically and 
economically-significant effects on the progressivity of the tax structures utilized by state 
and local governments.  The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor is 
positively-related to progressivity.  The tension between ethnic groups, measured with an 
index of ethnic residential segregation, has a negative impact.  The effects of these 
variables are considerably larger than that of the average voter's liberalism even with the 
latter variable held constant.  This suggests that the degree of ethnic overlap between the 
poor and the non-poor and the amiability of relations between ethnic groups reflect 
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components of voter preferences that may not be captured by measures of general voter 
ideology.  This is the first study to examine the association between ethnic residential 
segregation and state and local tax progressivity. 
Conceptual Framework 
 Some voters may view the adoption of more progressive tax policies as a means to 
promote economic justice while others may view it as punishment for hard work and 
ingenuity.  When elected representatives design a tax structure, they have to take 
conflicting interests into account.  How do the representatives weight these different 
interests?  In the United States, politicians have to compete for office.  Thus, the 
determination of tax policy should be examined in the context of electoral competition.  
 As was discussed at length in the previous chapter, Hettich and Winer (1999) 
developed a theoretical model in which the process of electoral competition forces 
political agents to take the interests of the electorate into account when designing the tax 
structure.  Candidates running for office choose the fiscal platform that maximizes 
expected support from citizens who vote their self-interest.  The weight that a particular 
citizen’s welfare receives can depend on the responsiveness of that citizen’s voting 
behavior to fiscal policy, whether he or she is a member of an organized interest group, 
and on the size of that group.    
 In Hettich and Winer’s model, voters only care about their own tax burden.  This 
assumption is questionable.  Analyses of survey data on support for redistribution by 
government by Fong (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) suggest that preferences 
for redistribution are influenced not just by financial self-interest but also by the extent to 
which one believes that the economic system is “fair”.  Respondents who believed that 
society provides equal opportunities to all and that economic well-being is mainly 
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determined by one’s own effort and ability tended to be less supportive of redistribution, 
ceteris paribus.  Emphasis on the role of personal effort and ability in the determination of 
one’s position in the income distribution tends to be associated with conservative views 
while belief in the dominance of luck and social connections tends to be associated with 
more liberal perspectives.  Fong (2001) finds that the marginal effects of respondents’ 
beliefs concerning distributive justice on support for redistribution were large in 
magnitude, even with respondents’ economic and demographic characteristics held 
constant.  The marginal effects of those beliefs were twice as large as those of income. 
The following theoretical model illustrates the manner in which electoral competition 
forces governments to take voters’ ideological preferences into account when choosing tax 
structures.  Suppose that society consists of two classes, rich (R) and poor (P).  The two 
groups are distinguished by different levels of innate labor productivity, denoted by ai, 
i=R, P.  The class difference exists because aR > aP.  Each group lives on labor income and 
a cash subsidy, f,  that is the same for both groups.  For both groups, utility is based on 
private consumption, Ci, leisure, Xi, and the consumption of the other income group, Cj.  
The government finances public good provision by levying ad valorem taxes on the labor 
income of the rich and poor, tR and tP.12  I assume a quasi-linear utility function.13 
 (3.1) 
 The parameter Θji is the weight that income group i places on the consumption of group j.  
I assume that it can be positive, negative, or equal to zero.  The parameter captures the 
liberalism of the income group.  For example, a poor group interested in “class warfare” 
                                               
12For simplicity, I assume that the government can observe the innate ability of each income group. 
13Quasi-linearity simplifies the model since the income effects only show up in the linear components.  This 
assumption is common in political economy models of redistributive policies.  See Persson and Tabellini 
(2000). 
 
32 
 
may attach a negative weight to the consumption of the rich.  Alternatively, a poor group 
with conservative leanings may place a large positive weight on the consumption of the 
rich since they believe that the rich are entitled to the fruits of their labor.  A liberal rich 
group may heavily weight the consumption of the poor.   
 I assume that the real wage is exogenous and normalized at unity.  As was 
mentioned above, the productivity of each class differs.  Consequently, each class has a 
different amount of effective time available.14  The budget and time constraints of a voter 
from group i are given below: 
 (3.2) 
 (3.3) 
where Li is the voter’s labor supply and ti is the income tax rate on group i. 
The provision of the public good depends on the labor supply provided by each 
group.  Each voter chooses a utility-maximizing labor supply, taking the government’s 
fiscal policy and the consumption of the other group as given.  Substituting the voter's 
budget and time constraints into the utility function gives her objective problem: 
 
(3.4) 
Taking the first-order condition and solving for the utility-maximizing labor supply yields 
 
(3.5) 
Labor supply is increasing in innate ability.  Consequently, the rich supply more labor and 
earn more income than the poor.  Substituting in the budget and time constraints gives the 
optimal Ci and Xi. 
                                               
14This specification is based on Persson and Tabellini (2000, 24). 
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 (3.6) 
 
 
(3.7) 
The government’s budget constraint is given by: 
 
(3.8) 
where si denotes a group’s population share. 
Substituting the constraints into the utility function gives a voter from group i’s indirect 
utility as a function of the tax rates. 
         (3.9) 
where  
Because labor supply is decreasing in the tax rate, the marginal revenue from each income 
group is diminishing.  The marginal revenue from one tax is not influenced by the other.  
Consequently, the cross partial from the revenue function is zero.  The pair of tax rates is 
determined through an election in which two office-motivated political candidates, A and 
B, simultaneously and noncooperatively propose their fiscal platforms.  Voter i prefers 
candidate A if 
 (3.10) 
where and are the tax rates proposed by candidates A and B, respectively.  
The parameter σ denotes the average relative charisma of candidate B and can be positive 
or negative. 15   I assume that σ has a uniform distribution on 
 
                                               
15Voting behavior must include a component that is random from the perspective of the candidates for an 
equilibrium platform to emerge.  See Mueller (2003, 249-257). 
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Given the distribution of σ, Candidate A’s expected vote share is given by 
 (3.11) 
where Si is group i’s population share.  Candidate A chooses tR and tP to maximize his 
expected vote share.  The first-order conditions are: 
 
(3.12) 
 
 
 
(3.13) 
The parameter δ has dropped out because it is a multiplicative constant.  It is apparent that 
the politically-optimal rate for each tax equates the marginal revenue from that tax with 
the marginal loss of expected political support attributable to that tax.  Because candidate 
B faces a symmetric problem, he offers the same platform.  The outcome of the election is 
determined by the distribution of σ, the average relative charisma of candidate B.16   
 Equations (3.12) and (3.13) determine the politically-optimal tRA and tPA as 
functions of the weight that each group places on the consumption of the other group 
along with other parameters. One can show that an increase in the weight placed on the 
consumption of group j by group i leads to a decrease in the politically-optimal tax rate 
levied on group j while having zero effect on the politically-optimal tax rate levied on 
group i.   In states in which the average voter is relatively liberal, the weight placed on the 
consumption of the rich by the poor is likely to be relatively light and/or the weight placed 
                                               
16The platform given by the solutions to equations (12) and (13) is an equilibrium platform provided that the 
second-order condition for a maximum holds.  Because the cross partials are zero, the second-order 
condition holds if  
The derivative of either of the first-order conditions with respect to ti can be written:  
Thus, the politically-optimal fiscal platform is an equilibrium platform. 
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on the consumption of the poor by the rich is likely to be relatively heavy.  Thus, the 
theoretical model suggests that tax structures should be relatively progressive in states in 
which the average voter is relatively liberal.  The analysis that follows gauges the 
direction and magnitude of the impact of average voter liberalism on state and local tax 
progressivity. 
Empirical Approach  
 The analysis utilizes data on the combined state and local tax burdens for each 
income quintile in each state provided by the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy 
(1996, 2003, 2009).  All three studies used the same methodology.  The income quintiles 
are specific to each state.  The authors utilized data on a stratified random sample that 
includes all household types and is statistically valid at the state level.  The studies present 
the average tax rates (i.e. the percentages of income paid to taxes) for each state-specific 
income quintile for 1995, 2002 and 2007.17  The estimated burdens consist of burdens 
imposed by personal and corporate income, general sales, property, cigarette, gasoline, and 
beer taxes.  The studies allow portions of certain tax burdens to be exported to non-
residents.  None of the studies take tax importing into account.  Corporate income, 
property, and retail sales taxes levied on firms could be passed forward to in-state or out-
of-state consumers or passed backward to in-state or out-of-state capital owners and 
                                               
17The Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) produced estimates for 1985 and 1991 in CTJ (1991).  The study used a 
different sampling strategy and different shifting assumptions than those used by Institute on Taxation and 
Economic Policy (ITEP) (2003, 2009).  Estimates for 1977 were provided by Phares (1980).  While the 
CTJ/ITEP studies were based on microsimulation approaches, Phares used aggregate state data to allocate 
total tax burdens to income groups.  Chernick (2005) pooled the Phares estimates with the CTJ estimates to 
form a 3-year panel.  I pooled the Chernick dataset with the CTJ/ITEP estimates, estimated the models 
described in Section IV, and conducted the Chow test for each equation.  The null hypothesis of parameter 
constancy was rejected in every case, which suggests that the two panels should not be pooled.  The results 
based on the CTJ/ITEP estimates are presented here.  Those based on Chernick’s data are omitted because of 
the space constraint but are available upon request.  When Chernick’s dataset is used, average voter and 
government liberalism are statistically insignificant. 
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workers.  The methodology is described in detail in Appendix 2. 
The empirical model can be summarized as follows:     
  
(3.14) 
where i and t are subscripts for the state and year, respectively.  The subscript j denotes 
neighboring states. Pit refers to one of three measures of state and local tax progressivity: 
the top quintile's average tax rate as a percentage of that faced by the bottom quintile (Top-
to-Bottom %), the average tax rate faced by the top quintile as a percentage of that faced 
by the middle quintile (Top-to-Middle %), the average tax rate faced by the middle quintile 
as a percentage of that faced by the bottom quintile (Middle-to-Bottom %). Models of the 
average tax rate faced by each income quintile were also estimated to determine how the 
regressors affect the average tax rates on each income group.  CLit and GLit denote the 
average voter’s and the government’s liberalism, respectively. The vector Xit consists of 
relevant state demographics.  The vector Eit consists of measures of measures of potential 
state tax exporting capacities.  WPjt  is the average tax variable of neighboring states or the 
spatial lag of the dependent variable.  Iit is a vector of state voting institutions.  Fi and Yt 
denote state and year fixed effects, respectively.  The random error is denoted by εit. 
 I used a measure of ideology that was developed by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and 
Hansen (1998) (hereafter referred to as the BRFH measure).  This measure has not been 
used in previous studies of state and local tax progressivity.  The authors used the average 
of ratings of incumbent Congress members in each district by the Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA) and the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education (COPE) 
to quantify ideology of the citizens. Berry et al assume that the ideological orientation of 
state legislators is the same as that of their congressional counterparts.  Additionally, they 
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assume that a challenger’s ideology score is equal to the average score of all incumbents 
in the state from the same party.  Each electoral district’s ideology score is the weighted 
average party ideology where the weights are each party’s vote share.  From the district 
scores, the authors calculate a state-level unweighted average.  A higher score denotes 
greater liberalism (Berry et al 1998).   
 Since it is based on congressional votes, the BRFH measure is potentially a more 
valid measure of the average voter’s operational ideology than alternative measures that 
have been previously used in this literature.  The strength of the measure, however, is 
limited by the extent to which political parties deviate from the platforms desired by 
voters.18   
 If the ideologies of the political parties are not identical, then majority rule will 
yield a government with an ideological orientation that may differ from that of the average 
voter.  A particular party’s share of political power increases if it wins the governorship.  
For these reasons, the model includes the BRFH measure of government liberalism in 
addition to the measure of citizen liberalism.  To calculate their measure of government 
liberalism, Berry and co-authors first assume that the minority party’s maximum share of 
power is forty percent while the majority’s minimum share is sixty percent.  If the 
majority’s share of power exceeds sixty percent, then it is assumed to have complete 
                                               
18If voters merely choose “the lesser evil”, then the BRFH measure is a limited measure of voter ideology. 
Another potential limitation of the measure is that it assigns equal weight to each voter.  It is likely to be the 
case that political influence varies.  Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1999) found that the wealthy were 
significantly more likely than the less well off to donate dollars and time to campaigns and participate in 
protests.  Thus, the weight that a voter’s utility receives may be directly-related to his or her income.  
Improving upon the BRFH voter ideology measure along the margins described above presupposes the 
availability of a survey dataset, with a state-representative sample, that reports respondents’ views of the 
economic system, policy preferences, and demographic characteristics.  The surveys utilized by Fong (2001) 
and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) are representative only at the national level.  The sample used by Erikson 
et al (1993) is representative at the state-level.  The limitations of their ideology measure are described in 
Section II. 
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control.  The governor and the legislature are assumed to have equal power.  The authors 
assume that the ideological orientation of state officials (including the governor) is the 
same as that of the state’s Congressional delegation, as measured by the ADA and COPE.  
The authors estimate “government liberalism” by taking the weighted average of the 
ideological scores of both houses of the legislature, where the weights are each party’s 
effective power, and adding the governor’s ideology score.  A higher value indicates a 
greater degree of liberalism.  The BRFH government liberalism measure does not 
necessarily reflect the ideological orientation of the individual state legislators. Thus, the 
validity of the measure depends on the degree of ideological homogeneity within each 
party.19  Because government liberalism is a function of average voter liberalism, I 
included only the component of government liberalism that is not explained by average 
voter liberalism.  More specifically, I regressed government liberalism over average voter 
liberalism, took the residual, and included the residual in the models instead of the raw 
government liberalism measure.20  I expect both average voter liberalism and the 
government liberalism residual to be positively-related to state and local tax progressivity. 
 The models include measures of state demographic characteristics that may 
influence voter demand for tax progressivity.  Research conducted by social psychologists, 
political scientists, and economists indicates that that people tend to be more generous 
toward others who are more similar to them ethnically, racially, linguistically, etc.21  Using 
survey data, Luttmer (2001) finds that people are less likely to support welfare spending if 
                                               
19Erikson et al (1993) developed a measure of mean state “elite ideology” based on survey responses from 
political party elites within each state.  However, this measure dates back to the mid-1980’s. 
20Using the raw government liberalism measure does not substantially affect the results.  Using the residual 
instead simplifies the interpretation of the results since one is not required to take into account the indirect 
effect of average voter liberalism on progressivity through its effect on government liberalism. 
21 See Fong and Luttmer (2011) for a review of the literature. 
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they live near welfare recipients of another race.  Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find an 
inverse relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and welfare spending among the U.S. 
states.  Hero (1994) does not find a relationship between ethnic heteroeneity and state and 
local tax progressivity.  However, the author did not control for state tax exporting 
capacities or spatial dependence.  I measure the ethnic congruence between the poor and 
the non-poor by estimating the probability that two randomly-drawn individuals, one from 
the poor population and the other from the non-poor population, are of the same ethnicity 
(Ethnic Congruence). If we denote the proportion of the non-poor who are in ethnic group 
k as  and the proportion of the poor who are from group k as  then   
 
where k = (Hispanics, non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic African-Americans, other non-
Hispanic) 
The “non-poor” group consists of individuals with household incomes above the state 
median while the “poor” group consists of individuals with household incomes in the 
bottom fifth of the state's income distribution.22   
 The ethnic congruence measure does not account for variation in the amiability of 
relations between ethnic groups.  If greater diversity leads to greater contact between 
individuals of different ethnic groups then it may actually increase support for 
redistributive fiscal policies.  Roch and Rushton (2008) examine the effects of racial 
diversity and residential segregation on white voter support for an Alabama state 
referendum that would have substantially increased the progressivity of the state's tax 
                                               
22Hero (1994) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) use a measure of ethnic fractionalization which is the 
probability that two randomly-drawn individuals are of the same ethnicity.  During the time period of this 
study, the correlation between this measure and Ethnic Congruence is 0.94. 
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structure.  They find that white support for the measure at the county-level is significantly 
and negatively-affected by the degree of segregation but insignificantly affected by the 
African-American share of county population. Their results suggest that it is the degree of 
tension between racial groups—and not racial diversity itself—that influences support for 
redistributive fiscal policies.  I use the state-level analog of the county-level measure used 
in their study.  Let be the proportion state i's white population living in census tract q and 
let be the proportion of state i's non-whites living in census tract q.  Then 
 
 If each census tract has the same proportion of white and non-white residents as the state 
as a whole, then this segregation index equals zero.  An index value of 100 indicates 
complete segregation.  The measure can be interpreted as the proportion of the state's non-
white population who would need to move to a different tract in order to reduce 
segregation to zero.23  As was mentioned above, greater diversity may increase support for 
redistributive fiscal policy by increasing contact between different ethnic groups.  
However, individuals who are already comfortable with other ethnic groups may choose to 
live among them.  Regardless of whether residential segregation reinforces or reflects 
animosity between ethnic groups, it can be viewed as a proxy for the degree of ethnic 
group tension.  The African-American share of state population is included in the models 
because Fong (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) find that African-Americans tend 
to be more supportive of redistribution. 
                                               
23I obtained the segregation data from William H. Frey and the University of Michigan Social Science Data 
Analysis Network.  The authors calculated the segregation index from 1990 and 2000 decennial Census data 
and from American Community Survey data pooled from 2005 to 2009.  I used the estimates derived from 
ACS data for 2007 and produced estimates for 1995 and 2002 with linear interpolation.  The authors 
calculated the indices for white-African -American, white-Hispanic, and white-Asian segregation.  I use a 
weighted average of these indices where the weights are each non-white group's share of the sum of the 
state's Hispanic, non-Hispanic African-American, and Asian populations. 
41 
 
 The model also includes the percentage of a state’s population age sixty-five or 
older.  This group is likely to have a high consumption-to-income ratio.  All else equal, it 
should prefer greater reliance on income taxes relative to consumption taxes.  Thus, I 
expect the elderly population share to be associated with a progressive distribution of tax 
burdens.  The model includes the percentage of workers who are labor union members 
since labor unions tend to promote redistributive fiscal policies.24  I also control for 
income inequality, measured with the ratio between the mean and median household 
incomes, since a relatively high degree of inequality may create political pressure for 
redistribution (Hettich and Winer 1999; Chernick 2005).  Numerous empirical studies of 
the political economy of subnational tax and spending policies control for per-capita 
income and the poverty.25  Thus, those variables are controlled in the models estimated 
here. 
The equations include measures of a state’s capacity to export taxes to 
nonresidents via the federal deductibility of state and local taxes and interstate commerce.  
The federal deductibility offset for residents is measured with the net-of-federal-
deductibility price of $1 of deductible state and local taxes. The method for calculating the 
tax price was described in Chapter 2.  Since high-income households are more likely to 
itemize and tend to face relatively high federal tax rates, deductibility lowers the political 
costs associated with taxing these households, ceteris paribus.  Thus, I expect the tax price 
measure to be positively-related to the tax progressivity measures.  Feldstein and Metcalf 
(1987) make a strong case for the possibility that the tax price is subject to reverse 
                                               
24See Radcliff and Saiz (1998) 
25See Rork (2003), and Fletcher and Murray (2006). 
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causation.26  To address this issue, I used a GMM model which is described in detail in the 
next subsection.   
The models include proxies for a state’s capacity to export taxes through interstate 
commerce.  The ratio between state retail sales per-capita and the national average (Sales 
Activity Index) is a proxy for the importance of tourism in a state’s economy.  Tourism 
provides opportunities for consumption tax exporting, which can influence state and local 
tax progressivity in two ways.  Consumption tax exporting opportunities may encourage 
reliance on the sales and excise taxes, which reduce progressivity.  However, the fact that 
nonresidents bear some of the burden allows governments to raise a given amount of 
revenue with a lower consumption tax rates.  Tourism may also encourage greater reliance 
on license fees, which may align the benefits obtained by tourists more closely with the 
costs associated with providing the public services that they utilize.27  For these reasons, 
the expected sign on the Sales Activity Index is ambiguous.  The presence of mineral 
resource industries can also provide opportunities for states to shift taxes to nonresidents, 
either through the sale of these goods outside of the state or through backwards shifting to 
investors.28  However, firms involved in these industries pay sales, corporate income, and 
property taxes.  Portions of all of these taxes could potentially be exported so it is unclear 
how the importance of mineral resources in a state’s economy should influence state and 
local tax structure. 
                                               
26If income tax rates are relatively high in a particular state, then more taxpayers are likely to itemize.  This 
would cause a downward bias.  Upward bias is also possible since deductions of state and local taxes lower 
taxable income which leads to lower federal tax rates for itemizers. 
27Gade and Adkins (1990) found that tourism had a positive impact on license fee reliance but a negative 
impact on income and general sales tax reliance.  Metcalf (1993) found evidence of a positive relationship 
between tourism and general sales tax reliance. Tourism did not appear to have a significant effect on license 
fees, according to his estimates. 
28If a state dominates a natural resource market, then it may be able to shift a portion of its business taxes 
forward to nonresident consumers.  Otherwise, any exporting of these taxes that occurs will be backwards to 
nonresident investors. 
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The politically-optimal tax structure for a particular state may be influenced by the 
tax structures adopted by its neighbors.  WPjt denotes the weighted average tax variable of 
state i’s neighbors, or the spatial lag of the tax variable.  I experimented with two 
weighting matrices that are frequently used in the literature: the simple contiguity matrix 
and the population-weighted contiguity matrix.  The simple contiguity matrix assigns a 
weight of 1/n to each neighboring state, where n equals the number of neighbors, and a 
weight of zero to non-neighboring states.  It calculates the unweighted average tax rate of 
neighboring states.  With the population-weighted contiguity matrix, the tax variable of 
each neighbor is weighted by its share of the total population of neighboring states since a 
state may be more (less) responsive to the tax policies imposed by their larger (smaller) 
neighbors.  As with the simple contiguity matrix, non-neighbors receive a weight of 
zero.29  The population weights are based on state population averaged across the sample 
period.  As with all models of strategic interaction between governments, the sign on the 
spatial lag is theoretically ambiguous (see Brueckner and Saavedra 2001; Rork 2003).  
Since the tax structure adopted by state i may influence those adopted by neighboring 
states, WPjt will be treated as endogenous.   
 The models control for year fixed effects.  State fixed effects are likely to be 
relevant.  However, the ratio between the average within standard deviation of each tax 
variable and its mean tends to be very small (see Table 1), meaning that state tax structures 
                                               
29The literature on fiscal competition includes studies that use weighting matrices based on economic or 
demographic similarity or on population flows.  The use of such weighting matrices may yield spurious 
results due to correlation between the fiscal variables and the elements of the weighting matrix (Anselin 
2001, Rork and Wagner 2012).  The exogeneity of the simple contiguity weights is explicit.  The population-
weighted contiguity weights are exogenous provided that state and local tax structures are not significantly-
correlated with state population.  To gauge the strength of this potential source of bias, I calculated the 
correlation between the progressivity ratios in each year and state population averaged across the sample 
period.  The average correlations across the sample period for the Top-to-Bottom, Top-to-Middle, and 
Middle-to-Bottom ratios were -0.127, 0.027, and -0.233, respectively.  The highest correlation that I obtained 
for a particular year was 0.311 for the Middle-to-Bottom Ratio. 
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changed little during this period.  Thus, most of the variation resulted from variation 
between states.  To allow the between variation to play a greater role in the analysis, I used 
indicator variables for the nine Census divisions (with New England as the reference 
category) instead of state fixed effects.  The results must be interpreted with caution since 
the regressors may be correlated with the state fixed effects and the Census division 
indicators may not completely absorb states’ time-invariant, unobserved characteristics.30  
Table 1 presents summary statistics.  The data sources are presented in Appendix 1. 
 Prior to estimating the above model, there are econometric issues that need to be 
addressed.   There are two potentially endogenous variables: the net-of-deductibility price 
of deductible state and local taxes and the neighbors’ weighted average tax burden 
measure.  To address the potential endogeneity, I used a generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimator with clustering by state.31 ,32 I used three instruments for the tax price 
                                               
30I estimated the models with the GMM fixed effects estimator and found that the fitted values and the 
estimates of the fixed effects were generally correlated.  This suggests correlation between the state fixed 
effects and at least one of the regressors.  When the simple contiguity spatial weights are used, the Census 
division indicators explain 30 to 51 percent of the variation in the state fixed effects estimates from each of 
the eight equations.  When the population-weighted contiguity matrix is used, the division indicators explain 
30 to 63 percent of the variation in the state fixed effects estimates.  Regardless of the spatial weighting 
matrix utilized, the division indicators explain at least 40 percent of the variation in the state fixed effects 
estimates in 6 out of 8 of the tax equations.  The time-invariant state heterogeneity that remains in the error 
term may be correlated with at least one of the regressors.  Consequently, the estimates presented here must 
be interpreted with caution. 
31The two-stage least squares estimator could also be utilized since it provides consistent estimates when at 
least one regressor is endogenous.  However, the generalized method of moments estimator is more efficient 
when the disturbance is heteroskedastic.  I conducted the Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
described by Greene (2003, 323-324).  The test rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity with every 
equation. 
32I considered the possibility that spatial autocorrelation is present in the error term.  It can be caused by 
measurement error or by unobserved factors affecting a state’s tax rates that are related across states (Anselin 
1988).  Let M denote the weighting matrix that applies weights to the residuals of all other states.  If spatial 
autocorrelation exists, then the estimates will be inefficient and the test statistics will be invalid.  I modeled 
M as an inverse-distance weighting matrix with a decay factor of 2 and a distance threshold beyond which 
spatial autocorrelation is assumed to be zero. 
  
 Thus, states that are closer in terms of distance between Census state population centers get more 
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measure: its tenth-order lag, the percentage of household heads who are married, and the 
average number of children per household.  The tenth-order lag of the tax price measure 
should be close enough to the current value but a deep enough lag to be uncorrelated with 
the error term.  Edmiston and Spong (2012) find that married households and households 
with children were more likely to itemize.  Thus, I expect the percentage of householders 
who are married and the average number of children per household to be inversely-related 
to the tax price.  I do not expect these variables to be directly related to state and local tax 
progressivity.   
  Following Rork (2003) and Fletcher and Murray (2006), I used the spatial lags of 
the exogenous regressors as instruments for the spatial lag of the own-state’s tax measure.  
These are valid instruments provided that they are jointly correlated with the spatial lag of 
the own-state tax variable, uncorrelated with own-state unobservables, and not directly-
related to the own-state tax variable.33  I also included the tenth-order lag of the average 
income tax share of own-source revenue for neighboring states. 
The instruments satisfy two criteria: from Wald tests, I found that the instruments 
are jointly correlated with the endogenous regressors34; in overidentification tests, I failed 
to reject the joint exogeneity of the surfeit of instruments.  These tests provide evidence of 
the validity of the instruments.   
To determine whether the use of GMM was justified, I carried out the Durbin-Wu-
                                                                                                                                             
weight.  With the decay term equal to 2, states that are further away get much less weight than states that are 
relatively close.  States that are more than 1,036 statute miles away are assumed not to matter.  The threshold 
of 1,036 miles was chosen because it is the mean distance between states in the sample period. Following 
Anselin and Kelejian (1997), I conducted Moran’s I test for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the 
GMM residuals from each of the three equations.  The null hypothesis of zero spatial autocorrelation was not 
rejected for any of the equations.  Thus, the test statistics presented below should be reliable. 
33See Kelejian and Robinson (1993). 
34I also conducted the Angrist-Pischke (2008) underidentification test for each endogenous variable in each 
equation.  The null hypothesis of underidentification was rejected at the 99.9 percent confidence level in 
every case. 
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Hausman endogeneity test.  The null hypothesis of exogeneity was rejected at the 95 
percent confidence level for all three of the progressivity ratio equations.  Thus, the 
discussion of the results will focus on the GMM estimates. 
Results 
 Table 3.2 presents the GMM regression results for the factors that influence the 
progressivity of state and local taxes.  Regardless of which spatial weighting matrix is 
used, average voter liberalism is positively and significantly related to the middle 
quintile's average tax rate as a percentage of that of the bottom quintile (Middle-to-Bottom 
%).  In other words, there is robust evidence of a positive relationship between average 
voter liberalism and progressivity toward the low end of the income distribution.  It is also 
positively-related to the average tax rate of the top quintile as a percentage of that of the 
bottom quintile (Top-to-Bottom %).  However, the effect is statistically-significant only 
when the simple contiguity spatial weights are used. Table 3.5 presents the effects of one 
standard deviation increases in key regressors on the three progressivity measures. When 
average voter liberalism is statistically-significant, the effect of an increase in that variable 
of one standard deviation falls between three and four percent of the mean value of the 
progressivity measure.  Thus, it appears that the effects of average voter liberalism on state 
and local tax progressivity are economically-insignificant.35,36  The estimated effects may 
have been larger if differences in political influence among voters could have been taken 
                                               
35I also estimated the equations with the Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) measure of average liberalism.  
The coefficient on this measure is significant only in the equation for the Middle-to-Bottom Ratio.  The 
magnitude of the effect is not substantially different from that of the BRFH voter liberalism measure.  These 
results are available from the author upon request. 
36Replacing Census division fixed effects with state fixed effects has a significant impact on the results.  
When state fixed effects are included, average voter liberalism is insignificant in all three of the 
progressivity equations.  It has a negative sign in the Top-to-Bottom and Top-to-Middle Ratio equations and a 
positive sign in the Middle-to-Bottom Ratio equation.  These results may be attributable to the low degree of 
within-variation in average voter liberalism.  Over the time period covered by this study, the average within 
variation in average voter liberalism was equal to 11 percent of the mean. 
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into account.  The BRFH measure of average voter liberalism is a voter population-
weighted average.  Political influence may be positively-correlated with wealth.  If this 
tends to be the case, then an income-weighted average ideology measure may more 
accurately gauge the influence of voter ideology on state and local tax progressivity.  
Government liberalism does not appear to be a significant determinant of progressivity.37   
 State ethnic demographics appear to significantly influence the distribution of tax 
burdens across income groups.  The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor 
is significantly and positively-related to all three progressivity measures.38,39 These results 
are at odds with those obtained by Hero(1994), who did not find a significant relationship 
between ethnic heterogeneity and state and local tax progressivity.  It is important to note 
that Hero did not control for tax exporting capacities and spatial dependence.  I obtain 
results that are similar to his when I exclude the tax exporting variables and the spatial lag 
(these results are available upon request).  I find that both the tax price measure and the 
Sales Activity Index are significantly correlated with Ethnic Congruence.40  This may 
explain the discrepancy between the two analyses.  Excluding the tax exporting variables 
and the spatial lag may produce biased results.   
 Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the GMM estimates of the average tax rate equations 
estimated with each of the spatial weighting matrices.  These estimates allow us to relate 
                                               
37The raw government liberalism measure is insignificant even when average voter liberalism is excluded.  
Excluding government liberalism or the residual measure does not substantially affect the coefficient on 
average voter liberalism. 
38Excluding average voter liberalism from the models does not substantially change the coefficient on ethnic 
homogeneity and vice versa. 
39When state fixed effects are used, the coefficient on Ethnic Congruence is positively-related to the Top-to-
Bottom %.   The coefficient is about a third of the size of the coefficient that is obtained when the Census 
division fixed effects are used.  It is only statistically significant when the population-weighted contiguity 
weights are used.  It is insignificant in the equations for the other two progressivity measures.  These results 
may be attributable to the low within-state variation in Ethnic Congruence.  The average within standard 
deviation is equal to about seven percent of the mean. 
40Both correlation coefficients are around 0.2. 
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the effects on the progressivity measures to effects on each income group.  We see that 
Ethnic Congruence is inversely-related to the average tax rate imposed on the bottom 
quintile and positively-related to average tax rate faced by the top quintile.  These results 
suggest that regressive taxation is more politically-costly when there is greater ethnic 
congruence between the poor and the non-poor.  Wealthy voters may get less disutility 
from paying taxes when members of their own ethnic group(s) constitute a large share of 
the beneficiaries.  A one standard-deviation increase in ethnic homogeneity is predicted to 
increase the Top-to-Bottom % by about fifteen percent regardless of which spatial 
weighting matrix is used.  The effect of a one-standard deviation increase in Ethnic 
Congruence on the Middle-to-Bottom % is equal to around eleven percent of the mean of 
that progressivity measure with both specifications of the spatial lag.  The effect is a little 
over three times that of average voter liberalism. 
 The degree of tension between ethnic groups, measured with an index of 
residential segregation, also appears to be significantly-associated with state and local tax 
progressivity.  A one-standard deviation increase in residential segregation is associated 
with a reduction in the Top-to-Bottom % of roughly ten percent.  It is also inversely-related 
to the other two progressivity measures but the effects are smaller in magnitude.  The 
residential segregation index is positively-related to the average tax rates faced by all five 
income quintiles.  However, the effects are larger for lower income groups.  These results 
suggest that greater tension between ethnic groups is associated with higher state and local 
expenditures as a share of state personal income but that these expenditures are financed 
with regressive tax structures.  Animosity between ethnic groups may be directly-related 
to spending on law enforcement and corrections.  However, an examination of the effects 
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of ethnic group tension on the composition of subnational government expenditures is 
beyond the scope of this study.      
 Like Chernick (2005), I find that the progressivity of neighboring states is 
inversely related to own-state progressivity.  The spatial lag is significantly and negatively 
related to all three of the progressivity equations.  This means that if neighbors’ tax 
structures become less (more) progressive on average, then a particular state’s tax 
structure will become more (less) progressive.  These results may reflect the development 
of tax havens within regions.41  Looking at Table 3.5, we see the effects of tax competition 
on progressivity are modest in magnitude regardless of which spatial weighting matrix is 
used.   
 A state’s capacity to export taxes through federal deductibility has a statistically 
and economically significant impact on state and local progressivity, gross of the 
deductibility offset. By offsetting the political and economic costs associated with state 
and local taxes on the wealthy, federal deductibility encourages subnational governments 
to adopt more progressive tax policies, ceteris paribus.  The size of the offset is decreasing 
in the net-of-deductibility cost of one dollar of a deductible tax, which is given by 
equation (2) or (3) in Chapter 2, depending on whether a state’s income tax system allows 
deduction of federal income taxes.  The net-of-federal-deductibility price of deductible 
state and local taxes is significant and negative in all three of the progressivity equations.42 
                                               
41When state fixed effects are included, the spatial lag has a positive sign in the equations for the Top-to-
Middle and Middle-to-Bottom ratios, which suggests that long-standing differences in the tax structures of 
contiguous states may be eroding (I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this interpretation).  These 
effects may have been driven by increased competition for firms and high-income households and/or by 
yardstick competition.  Another possible explanation is that the convergence of per-capita incomes among 
states brought about by movement of production factors has promoted the convergence of government 
expenditures and tax structures (Scully 1989; Annala 2003; Coughlin, Garrett, and Hernandez-Murillo 
2007). 
42When state fixed effects are included, the tax price appears to be positively-related to progressivity.  This 
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These findings are consistent with those obtained by Chernick (1992, 2005).  An increase 
in the net-of-deductibility price of deductible state and local taxes of one standard 
deviation is predicted to prompt a reduction in the Top-to-Bottom % equal to 
approximately twenty-five percent of the mean of that mean.  These results suggest that 
the indirect subsidy offered by deductibility has been a strong motivator for the adoption 
of progressive tax structures.  
 Tax exporting capacities arising from interstate state commerce influence the 
distribution of subnational tax burdens.  The Sales Activity Index is inversely-related to the 
Top-to-Bottom % and the Top-to-Middle % with both specifications of the spatial lag.  The 
magnitude of the effects are modest.  It appears that the prominence of tourism in a state's 
economy promotes the use of regressive tax structures.  Increases in the mining share of 
state private sector GDP are associated with small decreases in the Top-to-Middle %. 
Discussion 
 The survey-based research conducted by Fong (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2003) suggests that citizens’ preferences for redistribution are significantly affected by 
conceptions of fairness even when variables reflecting the extent to which they are likely 
to benefit financially from redistributive policies are held constant.  Voters’ conceptions of 
fairness are likely to be grounded in established ideologies.  This study compares the 
effects of ideology to the effects of other factors that constrain state and local 
policymakers.  I find that the impact of average voter liberalism is statistically significant 
and positive.  However, the effects are small in magnitude.  These results may reflect 
measurement error.  Thus, continued experimentation with the measurement of voter 
                                                                                                                                             
counterintuitive result may attributable to the low degree of within-variation in the tax price, which was 
equal to about 1 percent of the mean during the time period studied. 
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ideology may yield valuable results.   
 The ethnic congruence between the poor and non-poor and the degree of tension 
between ethnic groups appear to have substantial impacts on state and local tax 
progressivity.  When the poor and non-poor tend to be of the same ethnicity, state and 
local governments tend to utilize tax structures that are more progressive, ceteris paribus.  
The amiability of ethnic group relations, measured with an index of ethnic residential 
segregation, is inversely-related to progressivity.  Thus, the downward pressure on support 
for progressive taxation generated by ethnic dissimilarity between the poor and non-poor 
may be offset by greater congeniality between ethnic groups.  These results indicate that 
voter preferences concerning tax progressivity are not completely determined by narrow 
self-interest.  Voters appear to consider the impacts of state and local fiscal policies on 
others.  However, the weight that the non-poor attach to the well-being of the poor appears 
to be substantially shaped by ethnic group loyalty and by the degree of tension between 
ethnic groups.   The fact that these variables are significant even with average voter 
liberalism held constant suggests that the interaction between state ethnic demographics 
and voter altruism may not be captured by measures of general voter ideology.  
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Overall Std. Dev. Min Max 
Top-to-Bottom % 76.7 20.2 31.2 130.1 
Top-to-Middle % 85 13.9 38.1 115.2 
Middle-to-Bottom % 89.2 13.8 61 93.7 
Q1 Rate 10.796 2.128 4.7 17.6 
Q2 Rate 9.807 1.603 4.7 14.3 
Q3 Rate 9.458 1.532 4.8 14.3 
Q4 Rate 9.071 1.603 4.3 14.6 
Q5 Rate 8.059 1.869 3.013 13.833 
Average Voter Liberalism 50.12 15.8 8.45 95.972 
Government Liberalism Residual 0 23.673 -45.566 49.911 
Ethnic Congruence 0.593 0.171 0.312 0.967 
Residential Segregation Index 53.503 10.724 29.052 75.118 
African American 10.527 9.559 0.35 37.028 
Age 65+ 12.799 1.614 8.593 18.524 
Union Density 11.933 5.463 3 27.9 
Per-Capita Income ($1,000) 31.883 5.947 20.936 52.728 
Mining 2.531 5.269 1.189 0.314 
Marriage Rate 53.203 3.608 2.275 45.166 
Number of Children Per Household 0.704 0.092 0.05 0.516 
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Table 3.2: Pooled GMM Estimates for the Progressivity Ratio Equations 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Top-to-
Bottom % 
Top-to-
Middle % 
Middle-to-
Bottom % 
Top-to-
Bottom % 
Top-to-
Middle % 
Middle-to-
Bottom % 
 With Simple Contiguity Spatial Weights With Population Weights 
Average Voter Lib. 0.177* 0.0535 0.186*** 0.121 0.0236 0.149* 
  (0.026) (0.385) (0.000) (0.223) (0.716) (0.017) 
Gov. Lib. Residual -0.0114 -0.00709 -0.0214 -0.0194 -0.0174 -0.0309 
  (0.772) (0.809) (0.413) (0.694) (0.559) (0.298) 
Ethnic Congruence 69.72*** 20.96*** 56.72*** 68.80*** 19.40** 58.52*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Segregation Index -0.731*** -0.446*** -0.303** -0.796*** -0.513*** -0.367** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
African American 0.251 -0.106 0.341** -0.0173 -0.212 0.227* 
  (0.123) (0.327) (0.001) (0.927) (0.061) (0.046) 
Age 65 + -0.478 0.191 -0.612 -1.270 0.0679 -0.770 
  (0.635) (0.749) (0.339) (0.185) (0.908) (0.245) 
Union Density 0.119 0.193 -0.123 0.0422 0.286 -0.268 
  (0.705) (0.360) (0.565) (0.898) (0.149) (0.266) 
Per-Capita Inc. -0.288 -0.446 -0.241 0.402 -0.211 0.371 
  (0.563) (0.103) (0.552) (0.500) (0.482) (0.478) 
Income Inequality -18.91 -7.525 -2.625 -17.30 -8.323 -3.192 
  (0.310) (0.438) (0.864) (0.371) (0.421) (0.835) 
Poverty 2.078*** 0.893*** 1.647*** 2.595*** 1.136*** 1.857*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Price -1000.1*** -554.9*** -719.6*** -892.1*** -474.3*** -681.9*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Activity 
Index -0.402*** -0.252*** -0.152 -0.432*** -0.292*** -0.199* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.000) (0.048) 
Mining -0.298 -0.293* 0.131 -0.682** -0.549*** -0.103 
  (0.113) (0.034) (0.265) (0.002) (0.000) (0.453) 
Neighbors' 
Progressivity -0.635*** -0.658*** -0.654*** -0.510*** -0.469*** -0.437* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) 
2002 2.600 -7.033*** 10.03*** -1.209 -6.778*** 4.490* 
  (0.206) (0.000) (0.000) (0.621) (0.000) (0.016) 
2007 11.88* -9.366* 26.06*** 9.931 -6.953 19.83*** 
  (0.021) (0.016) (0.000) (0.105) (0.063) (0.000) 
Constant 1084.4*** 706.5*** 784.3*** 971.9*** 617.9*** 726.6*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-Squared 0.62 0.64 0.57 0/60 0.62 0.56 
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 
p-values in 
parentheses       
* p<0.05 
 ** p<0.01 
 *** p<0.001     
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Table 3.3: Pooled GMM Estimates of the Average Tax Rate Equations Using the  
Simple Contiguity Spatial Weights 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Q1 Rate Q2 Rate Q3 Rate Q4 Rate Q5 Rate 
Average Voter Liberalism -0.011 0.009 0.015 0.006 0.015* 
  (0.288) (0.217) (0.081) (0.365) (0.037) 
Government Lib. Residual 0.007 0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
  (0.150) (0.051) (0.593) (0.733) (0.201) 
Ethnic Congruence -4.431** 0.261 1.480 2.442 2.320* 
  (0.004) (0.834) (0.243) (0.052) (0.036) 
Residential Segregation Index 0.095*** 0.071*** 0.057*** 0.051*** 0.025* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) 
African American -0.054* -0.013 -0.020 -0.021 -0.043* 
  (0.035) (0.596) (0.361) (0.304) (0.014) 
Age 65 + -0.125 -0.031 -0.198* -0.201** -0.188*** 
  (0.345) (0.757) (0.035) (0.003) (0.000) 
Union Density 0.022 0.001 -0.021 0.005 0.006 
  (0.599) (0.977) (0.538) (0.859) (0.818) 
Per-Capita Income ($1,000) 0.052 -0.027 -0.076 -0.077 -0.137*** 
  (0.251) (0.489) (0.077) (0.065) (0.000) 
Income Inequality -0.343 0.076 -0.806 -1.081 -1.474 
  (0.842) (0.954) (0.450) (0.256) (0.213) 
Poverty 0.007 0.096* 0.181*** 0.207*** 0.243*** 
  (0.917) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Price 61.79*** -7.242 -39.69** -59.49*** -87.75*** 
  (0.000) (0.618) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Activity Index -0.029* -0.022 -0.018 -0.027** -0.032*** 
  (0.012) (0.052) (0.058) (0.004) (0.000) 
Mining -0.076** -0.053 -0.023 -0.027 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.058) (0.401) (0.296) (0.897) 
Neighbors' Tax Rate -0.053 -0.003 -0.164 -0.323* -0.453*** 
  (0.728) (0.984) (0.281) (0.015) (0.000) 
2002 -0.450 0.265 0.390* 0.112 -0.063 
  (0.192) (0.228) (0.036) (0.562) (0.769) 
2007 -1.864*** 0.056 1.018** 1.290*** 0.507 
  (0.000) (0.884) (0.006) (0.000) (0.128) 
Constant -42.54*** 14.10 49.28*** 69.82*** 99.52*** 
  (0.001) (0.308) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-Squared 0.46 0.42 0.51 0.66 0.75 
N 144 144 144 144 144 
p-values in parentheses      
* p<0.05 
 ** p<0.01 
 *** p<0.001    
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Table 3.4: Pooled GMM Estimates of the Average Tax Rate Equations Using the 
Population-Weighted Contiguity Spatial Weights 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Q1 Rate Q2 Rate Q3 Rate Q4 Rate Q5 Rate 
Average Voter Liberalism -0.011 0.009 0.015 0.006 0.015* 
  (0.288) (0.217) (0.081) (0.365) (0.037) 
Government Lib. Residual 0.007 0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
  (0.150) (0.051) (0.593) (0.733) (0.201) 
Ethnic Congruence -4.431** 0.261 1.480 2.442 2.320* 
  (0.004) (0.834) (0.243) (0.052) (0.036) 
Residential Segregation Index 0.095*** 0.071*** 0.057*** 0.051*** 0.025* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) 
African American -0.054* -0.013 -0.020 -0.021 -0.043* 
  (0.035) (0.596) (0.361) (0.304) (0.014) 
Age 65 + -0.125 -0.031 -0.198* -0.201** -0.188*** 
  (0.345) (0.757) (0.035) (0.003) (0.000) 
Union Density 0.022 0.001 -0.021 0.005 0.006 
  (0.599) (0.977) (0.538) (0.859) (0.818) 
Per-Capita Income ($1,000) 0.052 -0.027 -0.076 -0.077 -0.137*** 
  (0.251) (0.489) (0.077) (0.065) (0.000) 
Income Inequality -0.343 0.076 -0.806 -1.081 -1.474 
  (0.842) (0.954) (0.450) (0.256) (0.213) 
Poverty 0.007 0.096* 0.181*** 0.207*** 0.243*** 
  (0.917) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Price 61.79*** -7.242 -39.69** -59.49*** -87.75*** 
  (0.000) (0.618) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Activity Index -0.029* -0.022 -0.018 -0.027** -0.032*** 
  (0.012) (0.052) (0.058) (0.004) (0.000) 
Mining -0.076** -0.053 -0.023 -0.027 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.058) (0.401) (0.296) (0.897) 
Neighbors' Tax Rate -0.053 -0.003 -0.164 -0.323* -0.453*** 
  (0.728) (0.984) (0.281) (0.015) (0.000) 
2002 -0.450 0.265 0.390* 0.112 -0.063 
  (0.192) (0.228) (0.036) (0.562) (0.769) 
2007 -1.864*** 0.056 1.018** 1.290*** 0.507 
  (0.000) (0.884) (0.006) (0.000) (0.128) 
Constant -42.54*** 14.10 49.28*** 69.82*** 99.52*** 
  (0.001) (0.308) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-Squared 0.46 0.42 0.51 0.66 0.75 
N 144 144 144 144 144 
p-values in parentheses      
* p<0.05 
 ** p<0.01 
 *** p<0.001    
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Table 3.5: Summary of the Magnitude of Key Regressors on State and Local Tax 
Progressivity 
 
With Simple Contiguity Spatial Weighting Matrix 
 Top-to-Bottom % Top-to-Middle % Middle-to-Bottom % 
 Effect of 
std. dev. 
Increase 
% 
Change 
from the 
mean 
Effect of 
std. dev. 
increase 
% Change 
from the 
mean 
Effect of 
std. dev. 
Increase 
% 
Change 
from 
the 
mean 
Average Voter Lib. 2.88* 3.75 0.8 0.94 2.98*** 3.35 
Ethnic Congruence 11.85*** 15.45 3.56*** 4.19 9.64*** 10.83 
Segregation Index -7.82*** -10.19 -4.77*** -5.61 -3.24** -3.64 
Tax Price -20*** -26.08 -11.1 -13.08 -14.4*** -16.18 
Sales Activity Index -5.23*** -6.82 -3.3*** -3.88 -1.98 -2.24 
Mining -1.61 -2.09 -1.57* -1.85 -0.7 -0.78 
Neighbors’ 
Progressivity -6.31*** -8.21 -5.39*** -6.34 -4.96*** -5.62 
With Population-Weighted Contiguity Spatial Weighting Matrix 
 Top-to-Bottom % Top-to-Middle % Middle-to-Bottom % 
 Effect of 
std. dev. 
Increase 
% 
Change 
from the 
mean 
Effect of 
std. dev. 
increase 
% Change 
from the 
mean 
Effect of 
std. dev. 
Increase 
% 
Change 
from 
the 
mean 
Average Voter 
Liberalism 1.92 2.5 0.32 0.38 2.4* 3.13 
Ethnic Congruence 11.7*** 15.25 3.29*** 3.88 9.95*** 11.18 
Residential 
Segregation Index 
-8.52*** -11.11 -5.49*** -6.46 -3.93** -4.42 
Tax Price -
17.84*** -23.21 -9.48*** -11.15 -13.64*** -15.33 
Sales Activity Index -5.62*** -7.3 -3.79*** -4.46 -2.59* -2.91 
Mining -3.66*** -4.77 -2.94*** -3.46 -0.55 -0.62 
Neighbors’ 
Progressivity -6.12*** -7.98 -4.46*** -5.25 -4.17* -4.69 
* p<0.05 
 ** p<0.01 
 *** p<0.001 
 
Note: the significance stars are based on the GMM coefficients from Table 2. 
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Chapter 4: Tax Exporting and the Business Share of Sales Tax Levies 
 
The sales tax is an important component of state tax systems and a nontrivial 
revenue source for many local governments. In 2009, state governments obtained roughly 
one-third of their tax revenue from the sales tax.  In the same year, sales taxes provided 
about twelve percent of local tax revenue.  Economic analysis provides some support for 
the use of a consumption tax over the income tax, at least on efficiency grounds.  The 
personal income tax creates disincentives to earn both labor and investment income while 
the consumption tax only creates a disincentive to earn labor income.  In these analyses, 
the consumption tax is typically modeled as a tax that falls only on final consumption 
purchases.43  The sales taxes that are utilized by most state and many local governments 
are actually hybrids of a tax on final consumption and a business tax.  A substantial 
proportion of state and local sales tax revenue is garnered from non-labor business input 
purchases.  In 2008, among the forty-five states that utilize the sales tax, the percentage of 
sales tax revenue from business input purchases was approximately forty percent on 
average, ranging from twenty-seven percent in West Virginia to fifty-nine percent in 
Louisiana.  In 2008, sales taxes garnered from business input purchases constituted 
twenty-two percent of total state and local business tax levies on average. They were the 
second largest component behind the property tax, which constituted about thirty-six 
percent (Cline et al 2009).  The extensive taxation of business inputs may hinder 
efficiency by discouraging production in a particular state or by encouraging vertical 
integration among firms. If firms are able to pass taxes on inputs forward to consumers, 
then statutory exemptions of final consumption goods from the sales base, such as the 
                                               
43See Rosen (2005, 473-500) for a discussion of the economic costs of income and consumption taxes. 
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exemption for groceries, may be offset.   
If the taxation of business input purchases potentially has such adverse effects, 
then why do governments do it?  The incidence of taxes levied on firms is likely to be less 
apparent to voters than taxes that are levied on them directly.  The political costs of taxing 
business input purchases may be relatively low because of low burden salience and also 
due to tax exporting opportunities.  Depending on the mobility of capital in a particular 
state, taxes on input purchases may be passed backward to investors, many of whom may 
be nonresidents.  Corporations can deduct state and local taxes, including sales taxes on 
input purchases, from their taxable income under the federal corporate income tax.  
Proprietors can do the same under the federal personal income tax.  Both deductibility 
provisions enable state and local governments to shift portions of their business tax 
burdens to taxpayers at the national level.  The political efficacy of taxing firms is likely to 
depend not just on a state’s capacity to export taxes on firms but also on its capacity to 
export personal taxes levied directly on households, such as personal income taxes, taxes 
on residential property, and on retail purchases by consumers.  Household filers who take 
itemized deductions when filing federal income tax returns can deduct certain personal 
taxes but they cannot deduct taxes that are passed onto them by firms.  Reductions in the 
value of this particular deductibility offset brought about, for example, by reductions in 
federal income tax rates, could encourage subnational governments to reduce deductible 
personal taxes. These tax reductions may be accompanied by a reduction in public 
expenditure.  However, governments could recoup revenue lost to reductions in deductible 
taxes on households by increasing taxes on firms.   
Fletcher and Murray (2006) is the only previous study that examined the 
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determinants of sales tax bases.  The authors focused on tax competition and did not 
examine the impacts of tax exporting on state sales tax base choices.  The analysis 
presented here is the first that examines the relationship between tax exporting and state 
and local sales taxes levied on business input purchases.  I find no evidence that suggests 
that the exportability of taxes on firms is positively-related to sales tax levies on business 
inputs.  I find robust evidence that suggests that the federal deductibility offset provided 
for deductible personal taxes is inversely-related to these levies.  On average, the estimates 
indicate that the elimination of this particular federal deductibility offset would lead to a 
significant increase in state and local sales tax levies on business input purchases, ceteris 
paribus.  This particular offset does not appear to have a significant impact on consumer 
sales tax levies.  Overall, the results provide a compelling example of the influence that 
federal tax policy exercises over state and local tax policy.   
Background 
 Taxation of business input purchases has been a prominent feature of the state and 
local sales tax since the diffusion of sales tax usage began in the 1930s.  The level of sales 
tax revenues on business inputs in a state depends on both the sales tax rates levied on 
business input purchases as well as the range of business inputs included in the sales tax 
base.  All states exempt purchases of inventory for resale.44,45  Materials that are 
components of the final product or are elements of processing or fabrication are exempt in 
all but one state— Hawaii—which taxes those items at reduced rates.  Raw materials used 
in research and development are taxed by all but nine of the sales-taxing states.46  Utilities 
                                               
44Hawaii levies a reduced rate wholesale tax as part of its General Excise Tax. 
45The state sales tax information detailed in this discussion was taken from Research Institute of America 
(2011). 
46Those states are Arizona, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, 
and Virginia.  In a few other states, exemptions are available under certain circumstances.  For example, 
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used by firms are taxed by fourteen states.  Only four states currently apply the full sales 
tax to manufacturing equipment purchases, with eight states either levying reduced rates 
or limiting exemptions to new or expanding industries or to certain types of equipment.  
Equipment used outside of manufacturing, such as office furniture, telephones, and 
computers, are typically taxed among the sales-taxing states.  Intrastate 
telecommunications services are widely taxed while interstate telecommunications 
services are widely exempt.  Though there are common elements to many sales tax bases 
as far as business purchases are concerned, treatment of some inputs such as utilities and 
manufacturing equipment is not uniform. 
 Sales taxes levied on business input purchases, like any tax on a production factor, 
can potentially be borne by investors, workers, or consumers.  The distribution of the 
burden among economic actors depends on the characteristics of the affected market.  The 
manufacturers of taxed business inputs are responsible for remitting the tax.  If the taxing 
jurisdiction is a small, open economy (which applies to most state and local governments 
in the U.S.) and the firms located in the jurisdiction do not have market power, then the 
prices of traded goods are set on the “world” market and are fixed from the jurisdiction’s 
standpoint.47  Under these conditions, input producers are unable to pass the tax forward to 
their customers.  The taxes can only be borne by one or more groups of factor owners 
involved in the production of the taxed input.  If capital is perfectly mobile and the taxing 
jurisdiction is small and open, then the rental rate of capital is fixed outside the 
jurisdiction.  Consequently, investors escape the burden of the tax.  It is instead borne by 
the owners of the immobile factors of production: land and possibly labor.  Hamilton and 
                                                                                                                                             
Missouri exempts raw materials purchases made for research and development purposes by life science 
companies doing agricultural, pharmaceutical, or food research. 
47See Tresch (2002,  566-570)  for a discussion of tax incidence in an open economy. 
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Whalley’s (1989) analysis of the welfare effects of Canada’s manufacturer’s sales tax 
(MST) is the only general equilibrium analysis of a tax on business inputs of which I am 
aware.  The authors treat Canada as a small, open economy.  Capital and labor are the 
primary production inputs for each industry.  Some firms produce intermediate goods 
while others produce goods for final consumption.  The intermediate goods are traded so 
their prices are set in the global economy.  The authors assume that capital is perfectly 
mobile and that labor is immobile.  Given the assumptions of the model, the results of the 
analysis suggest that the burden of the MST was borne primarily by labor.   
 The assumption of perfect capital mobility may not apply equally to every industry 
that is affected by a sales tax on inputs.  Natural resources such as minerals, fossil fuels, 
and timber are production inputs for many industries.  Capital invested in natural resource 
production may not be perfectly mobile.  Consequently, investors in those industries may 
bear a portion of the tax.  Relaxing the assumption of perfect competition is also likely to 
affect incidence.  If the input producers have market power, then they can pass at least a 
portion of the tax forward to the input-purchasing firms.  Final incidence is difficult to 
predict since it depends on the substitutability of the taxed input with inputs that are not 
subject to the sales tax (e.g. land and labor), whether the final consumption goods are 
traded, and the degree of competition in the markets for the final consumption goods.  
There has been little formal analysis of these cases.   
 A tax on business input purchases, like any tax levied on firms, potentially reduces 
economic efficiency by altering the allocation of capital across jurisdictions.  The flow of 
capital out of a jurisdiction reduces labor productivity which leads to a decline in wages. 
Globalization is increasing competition between American localities and other countries, 
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many of which use value-added taxes (VATs) instead of retail sales taxes.  Since VATs tend 
to exclude business inputs from taxation to a far greater extent than the typical sales tax 
levied in the U.S., American subnational jurisdictions may find themselves at an economic 
disadvantage (Mikesell 2001).  Efficiency may also be hindered by tax-induced changes in 
production decisions.  Taxing input purchases creates a disincentive to replace old 
equipment (Mikesell 2001) In-house production of inputs, or vertical integration, may also 
be encouraged by business input taxation (Wildasin 2001; Mikesell 2001).48   
 The taxation of business input purchases may reduce tax equity if firms are able to 
pass these taxes forward to consumers.  The incidence of these price increases across 
income groups may be regressive, especially if the prices of goods that are often 
statutorily exempt from the sales tax, such as groceries, include a portion of the sales taxes 
on business input purchases.  Applying an input-output model to data on Maryland, 
Derrick and Scott (1993) find that the portion of the sales tax that is levied on business-to-
business transactions is more regressive than the sales tax on final consumption goods.  
The authors assumed that taxes paid on business-to-business transactions were passed 
forward to consumers. 
 Even though the taxation of business inputs may hinder both efficiency and equity, 
the inclusion of business inputs in the sales tax base may be politically-rational.  The 
portions of the burden that are deducted from the wages of resident workers, or the rental 
income of landowners, or from the investment income of resident capital owners, are 
hidden taxes.  The low visibility of the business share of sales tax levies enables 
governments to raise a given level of revenue at a lower advertised statutory rate.49  If 
                                               
48The disincentives to purchase or replace equipment can be offset by special sales tax credits. 
49Lohmann and Weiss (2002) present a formal model in which the government raises revenue from 
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capital invested in the taxed industry is immobile, then a portion of the burden is exported 
to nonresidents.  Firms can also deduct state and local sales taxes on business inputs from 
their federal taxable income, since they are part of their normal business expenses, which 
shifts a portion of the burden to taxpayers at the national level.  Tax exporting 
opportunities may enhance the political efficacy of taxing business inputs relative to 
alternative bases.  The analysis that follows examines the impact of tax exporting through 
federal deductibility and interstate commerce on business sales tax levies. 
Conceptual Framework 
 Political competition compels policymakers to take the economic interests and 
equity preferences of their constituents into account when developing tax policy.  The 
theoretical model developed by Hettich and Winer (1999) is used to guide the analysis.  In 
this model, which was described in Chapter 2, governments choose the tax structure that 
maximizes expected political support.  A government can potentially obtain greater 
support from voters by shifting tax burdens to non-residents.  Thus, the politically-optimal 
rate on each base should be increasing in the extent to which the burden is borne by 
nonresidents.  State and local sales taxes on firms could potentially be exported through 
both the deductibility and interstate commerce channels.  Firms can deduct state and local 
taxes sales taxes on input purchases from their federal taxable income.  Across all states, 
this shifts a portion of subnational business sales tax levies to national taxpayers.  Portions 
of state and local sales taxes levied on firms that sell goods outside of the state and 
perhaps have nonresident investors may be exported to nonresident consumers and/or 
investors.  This avenue for tax exporting may be particularly relevant for states with 
                                                                                                                                             
commodity taxes and faces electoral competition.  To voters, some commodity taxes are less visible than 
others.  The tax structure that maximizes the probability of reelection equates the perceived burdens of each 
tax.  The politically-optimal tax structure is characterized by a higher tax rate on the less salient tax. 
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natural resources such as fossil fuels, precious metals, and timber.  The ability of states to 
export sales taxes on the purchase of natural resource inputs to nonresident consumers 
depends on whether the state’s natural resource-oriented firms dominate their markets.  If 
those firms do not dominate their markets, then most of the exporting will be backwards to 
out-of-state investors.  The portion that is not borne by capital will most likely be divided 
between in-state workers and land owners.  Because of the potential exportability of taxes 
on natural resource firms, states in which natural resource industries are prominent are 
likely to obtain a larger share of sales tax revenue from business input purchases, ceteris 
paribus.   
The political efficacy of taxing firms may depend not just on the exportability of 
business taxes but also on the exportability of taxes levied directly on households.  The 
deductibility of state and local personal income, property, and retail sales taxes under the 
federal personal income tax has been an important avenue for the exportation of 
subnational personal taxes.  If the net-of-federal tax price of a deductible personal tax 
rises, then state and local governments are likely to reduce reliance on that tax.  If the 
marginal loss of expected political support associated with increasing business sales taxes 
is less than the marginal gain in expected support from additional revenue, then the 
government will recoup at least some of the revenue lost from reducing the personal tax 
by increasing business sales taxes.  The political economy framework presented here can 
be used to guide the empirical analysis that follows. 
Empirical Implementation 
 This study utilizes state-level data on state and local sales taxes levied on business 
input purchases.  Estimates were provided by Cline et al (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
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2009).50 The authors used national-level data from input-output tables by industry, state-
level data on value-added, sales, and employment by industry, and state and local data on 
sales tax rates and special provisions to develop the estimates.  Using national input-
output relationships for each industry and state-level data on industry value-added, sales, 
and employment, Cline et al (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) estimated state-level 
input-output tables.  They obtained estimates of sales taxes remitted from input purchases 
by applying each state’s sales tax rates and special provisions to the estimated input 
purchases. 
The data cover sales tax levies from 2003 to 2008.  I estimated models of the 
effective sales tax rates on business input purchases and on consumer purchases, 
separately.  The effective rate on producers is measured with sales tax revenue from 
business input purchases as a percentage of private-sector GDP.  The effective rate on 
consumers is measured with sales tax revenue from final consumption purchases as a 
percentage of state personal income.  To provide confidence that the results are not driven 
by changes in the denominators, each model is also estimated with per-capita measures of 
each type of sales tax levy.51  The empirical model can be summarized by 
 (4.1) 
 
 
 
(4.2) 
where i and t are subscripts for the state and year, respectively.  The subscript o denotes 
neighboring states.     
                                               
50Ring (1989, 1999) provided estimates only for the state level.  Consequently, his estimates could not be 
appended to the data used in this study. 
51Because the first-order lag of the dependent variable is included on the right-hand side, the first year of 
data from which the models are estimated is 2004. 
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The term Tit refers to one of the four sales tax measures described above.  Tit-1 is the first-
order temporal lag of the relevant tax measure.  The first-order lag is included to control 
for past state characteristics and events that may influence the contemporaneous tax rate.   
 The vector Eit consists of measures of a state’s capacity to export both business and 
personal taxes.  The benefit that a state derives from the exportation of business taxes 
through deductibility is gauged with the percentage of state GDP constituted by gross 
operating surplus.52 53 Because a state’s tax structure may influence business location 
decisions, the business share is treated as endogenous.  The generalized method of 
moments (GMM) model that I utilized is described below.  Deductibility offsets for firms 
may encourage subnational governments to utilize business taxes more heavily, ceteris 
paribus.   
The model includes the share of state private sector GDP constituted by value-
added from natural resource industries (mining, forestry, hunting, and fishing).  Because 
capital invested in these industries is likely to be characterized by a low degree of 
mobility, large portions of taxes levied on production in these industries may be passed 
backwards to capital owners, many of whom are likely to be nonresidents.  The 
prominence of natural resources in a state’s economy could be positively-related to sales 
tax levies on business input purchases.  The taxation of natural resource production may 
enable state and local governments to reduce consumer sales tax levies.  The ratio between 
a state’s per-capita retail sales and the national average (Sales Activity Index) is used as a 
proxy for the importance of tourism to a state’s economy.  The tax-exporting opportunities 
                                               
52Gross operating surplus is the sum of proprietors' income and corporate capital charges, which consists of 
corporate profits, rent payments made by corporations to landowners, and net interest payments. 
53An income-weighted net-of-federal deductibility tax price measure would be preferable but state-level data 
on the mean marginal tax rates on C corporations, proprietors, and S corporations are unavailable. 
67 
 
provided by tourism may encourage greater reliance on both consumer and producer sales 
tax levies.  The impacts ultimately depend on the manner in which each type of levy is 
divided between tourists and residents.   
The model also includes a measure of a state’s capacity to export personal taxes 
via federal deductibility.  During the time period analyzed, state and local personal 
income, property, and sales taxes paid directly by consumers (in lieu of personal income 
taxes) were deductible.  Thus, the model includes the net-of-federal-deductibility price of 
all deductible personal taxes.54 The derivation of this measure was described in Chapter 2.  
The tax price variable may potentially be positively-related to business sales tax levies.  
States may respond to reductions in the exportability of personal taxes by increasing 
business sales tax levies, provided that the marginal political costs associated with raising 
those levies are not prohibitive. The effect on consumer levies could either be insignificant 
or positive.  Because taxpayers have not been able to deduct both subnational sales and 
income taxes, the offset to consumer sales taxes may not have been meaningful in the 
forty-one contiguous states with broad-based personal income taxes.  Itemizers in those 
states are likely to choose to deduct state and/or local income taxes over sales taxes since 
they most likely pay a relatively higher fraction of their income to income taxes.  A rise in 
the net-of-federal tax price of deductible taxes raises the political cost of utilizing the 
personal income tax.  Consequently, subnational governments may respond by increasing 
reliance on the consumer sales tax levies. 
WTot  denotes the weighted average values of the sales tax burden measure of 
                                               
54To calculate the net-of-federal tax price, I used data on state itemization rates from the Internal Revenue 
Service’s Statistics of Income series.  I used data on average marginal federal tax rates on wage income for 
itemizers which were calculated from IRS samples of tax returns with the Taxsim program. Daniel Feenberg 
computed the estimates and generously provided them. 
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neighboring states, or its spatial lag.  As I did in the analysis presented in the previous 
chapter, I estimated the models with the simple contiguity and the population-weighted 
contiguity spatial weights.  I also treated the spatial lag and the tax price as endogenous. 
The vector Xit consists of measures of state demographic and ideological 
characteristics.  Support for the use of regressive tax instruments such as the sales tax may 
be weaker in states in which the poor and the non-poor tend to be of the same ethnicity.  
The degree of tension between ethnic groups may be directly-related to support for 
regressive taxation.  Like the models that were presented in the previous chapter, these 
models include the measure of the ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor 
(Ethnic Congruence) as well as the residential segregation index.  The African-American 
share of the population is included to control for a possible inverse relationship between 
the density of African-Americans among voters and the use of consumption taxes.  The 
model includes the measure of average voter liberalism developed by Berry et al (1998).  
The component of the Berry et al (1998) measure of government liberalism that is not 
explained by average voter liberalism (Government Liberalism Residual) is also included.  
The models also control for the elderly population share and per-capita income. Θi and Yt  
are state and year fixed effects, respectively. 
 Three variables in the model may be subject to reverse causation:  the net-of-
federal-deductibility price of deductible personal taxes, the business share of state GDP 
and the spatial lag of the relevant tax variable.  Another estimation challenge is posed by 
the possible correlation between the first-order temporal lag of the tax variable and the 
state fixed effect.  When a dependent variable is persistent or highly correlated across 
time, then the first-order lag of the dependent variable may be correlated with the fixed 
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effect.  I employed a dynamic panel model to address the possible correlation of the first-
order lag of the tax variable and state fixed effect and also to address the possible 
endogeneity of the four regressors stated above. The estimation framework is generalized 
method of moments (GMM).  The specific dynamic panel model that I utilized is the 
system GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).55    
 The Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator could potentially generate consistent 
estimates of the endogenous variables.  Estimating the system of equations involves 
estimating equation (4) in levels and differences simultaneously.  This estimator utilizes 
instrumental variables to obtain predicted values of the endogenous variables for inclusion 
in the tax levy equations.  For the differenced equation, the excluded instruments are the 
second-order lags of the levels of the endogenous regressors.  To increase the efficiency of 
the estimates, the Blundell-Bond system includes equation (4) in levels.  The excluded 
instruments for the endogenous variables in levels are their lagged differences.  In the 
standard model, only the first-order lags of the differences are used since deeper lags are 
likely to be redundant.  The corresponding differenced and levels variables are stacked and 
the first and second stage levels and differences equations are estimated as a system.  The 
estimates from the second stage levels and differences equations are constrained to be the 
same so estimation of the system yields a single estimated equation.  The Blundell-Bond 
system GMM estimator provides consistent estimates of the coefficients of the 
endogenous variables under the assumptions that there is no second-order serial 
correlation and that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms.  I test for the 
validity of these assumptions and present the test results below.   
                                               
55Blundell and Bond (1998) builds upon previous developments presented by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995).  The correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the fixed effect 
declines with time.  Consequently, it is only a serious source of bias in short panels. 
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 The specification that I utilized is a departure from the standard Blundell-Bond 
model.  Because all available lags of the levels of the endogenous variables are used as 
instruments, the model can potentially generate a large number of instruments.  When the 
number of cross-sectional units is small, which is the case with a state-level analysis, the 
standard model can produce a large number of instruments relative to the sample size.  
When the number of instruments is large relative to the sample size, the endogenous 
variables may be over-fitted and the endogenous elements of those variables may not be 
purged.  An additional problem is that the test statistics may not be estimated precisely.  To 
reduce these risks, I limited the instrument set for the differenced equation to the first 
available instruments for each year, which are the second-order lags of the endogenous 
variables in levels. 
It is possible that the error term consists of a spatial lag, φ MUj, and a mean-zero, 
random error εit.  In other words, spatial autocorrelation may be present in the model.  It 
can be caused by measurement error or by unobserved factors affecting a state’s tax rates 
that are related across states (Anselin 1988).  The scalarφ gives the magnitude of the 
spatial autocorrelation while the matrix M is a weighting matrix that applies weights to the 
residuals of all other states.  If spatial autocorrelation exists, then the estimates will be 
inefficient and the test statistics will be invalid.  I modeled M as an inverse-distance 
weighting matrix with a decay factor of two and a distance threshold beyond which 
autocorrelation is assumed to be zero.  The threshold of 1,036 miles was chosen because it 
is the mean distance between state population centers.56  The weighting matrix is given by 
                                               
56Setting the threshold at 1,639 miles, which is one standard deviation above the mean distance does not lead 
to estimates that are substantially different.  These results are not presented here but are available upon 
request. 
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(4.3)   
 
Thus, states that are closer in terms of distance between Census state population centers 
get more weight.  With the decay term equal to 2, states that are further away get much 
less weight than states that are relatively close.  States that are more than 1,036 statute 
miles away are assumed not to matter.  Following Anselin and Kelejian (1997), I 
conducted the Moran’s I test for the presence of spatial autocorrelation in the GMM 
residuals from each equation.  I used the weighting matrix given by (4.3) to weight the 
residuals.57  The tests rejected the null hypothesis of zero spatial autocorrelation only for 
the equation effective sales tax rate on consumers with the simple contiguity spatial 
weights.  For that equation, the Cochrane-Orchut-style data transformation recommended 
by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) was implemented to purge the spatial autocorrelation from 
the data.  The final specification utilized for all models was the Blundell-Bond GMM 
model with clustering by state.  Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics.  The data 
sources are presented in Appendix 1. 
Results 
 The Blundell-Bond estimates for the producer levies models are presented in Table 
4.2 while those for the consumer levies models are presented in Table 4.3.  The 
instruments are valid provided that second-order autocorrelation is not present and the 
correlation between the instruments and the error term is not statistically significant.  As 
                                               
57The weight matrix is row-normalized so that each row of weights sums to one and the matrix computes a 
weighted average of the residuals of all other states. 
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one can see in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, second-order autocorrelation does not appear to be 
significant in any of the equations.  Because the instruments outnumber the endogenous 
variables, it is possible to test the exogeneity of the surfeit of instruments, or the 
overidentification restrictions.  The Hanson’s J test is a test of the exogeneity of the 
overidentification restrictions that is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  The 
p-values for the Hanson’s J test indicate that the correlation between the surfeit of 
instruments and the errors is never significant at the ninety-five percent confidence level.  
These test results provide support for the estimates of the effects of the endogenous 
regressors. 
 Looking at Table 4.2, we see that the net-of-federal-deductibility price of 
deductible personal taxes has a significant and positive effect on both the effective sales 
tax rate on business input purchases and on sales tax revenue from these purchases per 
capita.  This is the case whether the simple contiguity or population-weighted contiguity 
matrix is used to calculate the spatial lag.  The tax price of deductible personal taxes does 
not appear to have a significant impact on sales tax levies on consumer purchases.  These 
results suggest that if the exportability of personal taxes via deductibility is reduced, 
which would be reflected in a higher net-of-deductibility price, then state and local 
governments are likely to respond by increasing sales tax levies on firms. The 
deductibility offset available to firms does not appear to have significant impacts on 
producer sales tax levies.  Neither the natural resources share of private GDP nor the Sales 
Activity Index appear to have significant impacts on producer or consumer sales tax levies.  
Thus, the potential tax exporting opportunities offered by natural resources-oriented 
production and tourism do not appear to be significant determinants of sales tax levies on 
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producers or consumers.   
 Other results are worth discussing briefly.  Ethnic Congruence is inversely-related 
to both the effective sales tax rate on producers and producer sales tax levies per-capita.  
The effects are small in magnitude.  It does not appear to be significantly related to 
consumer sales tax levies.  It is possible that altruism among the non-poor is weaker when 
the poor and non-poor tend to be members of different ethnic group(s).  If this is the case, 
then the non-poor may get more disutility from taxation in relatively heterogeneous states.  
It may be politically-efficacious for governments in relatively heterogeneous states to rely 
more heavily on hidden taxes like the sales tax on business purchases.  The first-order lags 
of the dependent variables have positive and highly significant coefficients in all 
specifications.  The spatial lag is significant only in the equation for the effective sales tax 
rate on consumers and only when the simple contiguity spatial weights are used.  Thus, 
these analyses do not present robust evidence of spatial interaction in the determination of 
sales tax levies on consumers and producers. 
Policy Implications 
 As was discussed in Chapter2, an increase in the net-of-deductibility price for 
personal taxes is likely to prompt state and local governments to reduce the burdens 
imposed by personal income and property taxes.  Changes in personal income and 
property tax burdens could be accompanied by a number of policy changes in other areas 
of state and local budgets.  Governments could reduce spending or increase the burdens 
imposed by other taxes.  The analysis presented here suggests that they are likely to offset 
reductions in personal income and property taxes by increasing business sales tax levies. 
The estimated effects are large enough to suggest that substantial reductions in the value 
of the deductibility offset for personal taxes could lead to significant increases in business 
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sales tax levies.   
 The elimination of the deductibility of state and local personal taxes is periodically 
considered by federal policymakers.  This is because it is a relatively large tax expenditure 
that cost the federal government approximately $78 billion dollars in 2008.58  Elimination 
of the deductibility of personal taxes was recommended by the U.S. Treasury and by 
President Reagan in the mid-1980s and by a presidential advisory panel in 2005 (see U.S. 
Treasury 1984; President Reagan 1985; and President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform 2005).  These reports recommended the elimination of deductibility under the 
belief that most state and local expenditures do not have strong national spillovers and 
those that do should be subsidized with direct federal outlays.  If deductibility had been 
eliminated in 2008, the most recent year in this dataset, the net-of-deductibility price of 
deductible personal state and local taxes would rise from $0.935 to $1.00.  The estimates 
presented here suggest that, on average, this policy change would have lead to substantial 
increases in the effective sales tax rate on producers and in sales tax revenue from 
business input purchases per-capita.  These predicted effects are summarized in Table 4.4.  
The estimated effect of the elimination of deductibility on producer sales tax levies 
depends on the way that producer levies are scaled and on the specification of the spatial 
lag.  Regardless of the specification of the spatial lag, the average estimated effect of 
elimination of deductibility in 2008 is an increase in the effective sales tax rate on 
producers of approximately thirty percent of the mean of that tax variable.  When the 
simple contiguity spatial weights are used, the average estimated effect of the elimination 
of deductibility is an increase in producer sales tax levies per-capita equal to about twenty-
                                               
58See Urban Institute and Brookings Institution (2009). 
 http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/expenditures/largest.cfm. 
75 
 
five percent of the mean.  The estimated effect is somewhat smaller when the population-
weighted contiguity spatial weights are used. 
 Tax incidence analysis suggests that while portions of these increases may be 
exported to nonresident capital owners (in jurisdictions in which capital is immobile), 
substantial shares may be divided among resident workers and landowners.  Residents 
may not be aware of this shift of tax burdens from personal income and property taxes 
toward business taxes that end up deducted from wages or rental income.  Thus, the 
elimination of deductibility could prompt state and local governments to make tax policy 
changes that reduce the transparency of the tax system.  From a normative standpoint, this 
is problematic since increased reliance on hidden taxes hinders the ability of citizens to 
compare the costs and benefits of subnational public services.  The predicted increases in 
sales taxes on firms may also promote the flight of capital to jurisdictions, perhaps abroad, 
with lower business tax levies.  Thus, any efficiency gains that may arise from reductions 
in personal income and property tax burdens may be offset by distortions generated by 
increases in sales tax levies on firms.    
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study was to provide insights on the incentives that 
policymakers have to apply the sales tax to input purchases made by firms.  Previous 
studies have presented evidence that suggests that tax exporting influences state and local 
tax structure but they have devoted little attention to the effects of tax exporting on taxes 
that are levied on firms.  This study used state-level panel data on state and local sales 
taxes garnered from business input purchases and a GMM model to estimate the effects of 
potential tax exporting capacities on sales taxes levied on firms.  I find that these levies, 
whether measured as a percentage of private-sector GDP or per-capita, are largely 
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determined by the exportability of state and local personal taxes via deductibility.  When 
the exportability of personal taxes via deductibility is high (low), sales taxes on firms are 
likely to be low (high), ceteris paribus.  The study did not yield evidence that the state and 
local sales taxes levied on firms are influenced by the exportability of business taxes.  
Interstate tax competition does not appear to constrain the taxation of business input 
purchases by subnational governments.  
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Effective Rate on Producers 0.99 0.53 0 2.75 
Producer Levies Per-Capita 352.76 201.02 0 1083.71 
Effective Rate on Consumers 1.4 0.62 0 3.02 
Consumer Levies Per-Capita 474.2 196.38 0 1232.42 
Tax Price 0.93 0.02 0.88 0.97 
Business Share 35.3 4.112 28.446 52.166 
Natural Resources 3.21 6.14 0.05 39.98 
Sales Activity Index 1.039 0.168 0.544 1.671 
Per-Capita Income ($1,000) 34.75 5.16 25.35 52.73 
Age 65+ 12.79 1.51 8.63 17.4 
Ethnic Congruence 0.569 0.162 0.312 0.936 
Residential Segregation Index 53.768 8.949 33.804 71.504 
African American 10.023 9.513 0.14 37.36 
Average Voter Liberalism 55.507 15.977 20.254 93.282 
Government Liberalism Residual 54.76 27.842 5.359 33.383 
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Table 4.2: Blundell-Bond Estimates for Sales Tax Levies on Producers 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Effective Rate on Producers Producer Levies Per-Capita 
 Contiguity Population Contiguity Population 
First-Order Lag of Producer Levies 0.734*** 0.736*** 0.779*** 0.776*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Price 4.951** 4.929** 1459.4** 1282.8** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.019) 
Business Share 0.005 0.005 4.143 2.992 
  (0.469) (0.457) (0.184) (0.351) 
Natural Resources 0.003 0.003 1.800 2.540* 
  (0.614) (0.650) (0.324) (0.096) 
Sales Activity Index -0.010 -0.012 -9.604 4.884 
  (0.893) (0.878) (0.759) (0.843) 
Neighbors’ Producer Levies -0.035 -0.078 -0.118 -0.132 
  (0.617) (0.622) (0.162) (0.184) 
Ethnic Congruence -0.411** -0.377* -118.6** -124.8** 
  (0.043) (0.053) (0.022) (0.024) 
Residential Segregation 0.002 0.002 0.773 0.774 
  (0.536) (0.545) (0.336) (0.432) 
African American -0.003 -0.003 -0.955 -0.921 
  (0.289) (0.289) (0.143) (0.207) 
Age 65 + -0.012 -0.012 -4.586 -5.763 
  (0.414) (0.421) (0.287) (0.218) 
Per-Capita Income ($1,000) 0.0001 0.0002 2.231 2.186* 
  (0.977) (0.973) (0.126) (0.085) 
Average Voter Liberalism -0.001 -0.001 -0.485 -0.173 
  (0.359) (0.353) (0.175) (0.682) 
Government Liberalism Residual 0.0002 0.0002 -0.007 -0.028 
  (0.780) (0.775) (0.981) (0.915) 
Constant -4.126* -4.114* -1344.7** -1149.3** 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.031) (0.018) 
Second-Order Autocorrelation Test 
(p-value) 0.424 0.413 0.568 0.606 
Hanson's J (p-value) 0.167 0.263 0.267 0.366 
N 240 240 240 240 
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.10 
 ** p<0.05 
 *** p<0.01   
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Table 4.3: Blundell-Bond Estimates for Sales Tax Levies on Consumers 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Effective Rate on Consumers Consumer Levies Per-Capita 
  Contiguity Population Contiguity Population 
First-Order Lag of Consumer Levies 0.824*** 0.853*** 0.907*** 0.897*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tax Price 0.958 2.226 577.8 980.1 
  (0.752) (0.348) (0.547) (0.194) 
Business Share -0.001 0.004 1.265 1.937 
  (0.903) (0.546) (0.438) (0.311) 
Natural Resources 0.003 0.001 1.411 0.864 
  (0.672) (0.849) (0.456) (0.588) 
Sales Activity Index -0.049 -0.012 -11.68 -10.44 
  (0.870) (0.862) (0.708) (0.718) 
Neighbors’ Consumer Levies 0.287** 0.011 -0.006 -0.065 
  (0.038) (0.932) (0.959) (0.511) 
Ethnic Congruence -0.170 -0.183 -22.42 -41.62 
  (0.598) (0.539) (0.744) (0.619) 
Residential Segregation -0.001 0.0003 -0.179 -0.218 
  (0.788) (0.911) (0.839) (0.772) 
African American -0.005 -0.0005 0.020 0.125 
  (0.329) (0.935) (0.974) (0.877) 
Age 65 + 0.026 -0.0006 0.853 -1.542 
  (0.101) (0.966) (0.850) (0.754) 
Per-Capita Income ($1,000) 0.002 -0.002 2.025 2.006* 
  (0.738) (0.742) (0.286) (0.078) 
Average Voter Liberalism 0.001 -0.0004 -0.109 -0.055 
  (0.653) (0.770) (0.855) (0.916) 
Government Liberalism Residual 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.122 -0.142 
  (0.920) (0.852) (0.418) (0.371) 
Constant -1.633 -1.772 -559.6 -884.6 
  (0.654) (0.458) (0.540) (0.176) 
Second-Order Autocorrelation Test 
(p-value) 0.286 0.260 0.250 0.242 
Hanson's J (p-value) 0.403 0.517 0.417 0.677 
N 240 240 240 240 
p-values in parentheses     
* p<0.10 
 ** p<0.05 
 *** p<0.01  
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Table 4.4: Effects of the Elimination of Federal Deductibility of Personal Taxes on 
Sales Tax Levies on Producers 
 Effect % Change from the Mean of Tax 
Measure in 2008 
Effective Sales Tax Rate on Producers   
with simple contiguity matrix 0.302 30.69 
with population-weighted contiguity matrix 0.301 30.59 
Producer Levies Per-Capita   
with simple contiguity matrix $89.02 24.79 
with population-weighted contiguity matrix $78.25 21.73 
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Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions, and Research Prospects 
Dissertation Summary 
 
 State and local governments utilize multiple tax instruments.  The choice of tax 
rates, or the tax structure, influences the efficiency and equity of subnational fiscal 
systems.  The determination of tax structure at the subnational level requires policymakers 
to make tradeoffs between efficiency, equity, and the potential political benefits from tax 
exporting.  Thus, variation in state and local structures may reflect variation in voter 
ideology, demographics, tax exporting capacities, and regional fiscal landscapes.  This 
dissertation presents two empirical studies that extend the positive empirical literature on 
state and local tax structure determination.   
 Chapter 2 reviewed three empirical literatures that are relevant for the research 
presented in the two empirical chapters: the political science literature on the influence of 
ideology on state and local tax progressivity and the empirical economics literatures on tax 
exporting and tax competition.  These studies also account for most of the positive 
empirical analysis of state and local tax policy that has been conducted.  Researchers have 
found a direct relationship between average voter liberalism and state and local tax 
progressivity.  However, the studies used measures of voter ideology that either did not 
account for change in the electorate’s ideological orientation over time, or they failed to 
account for differences in the intensity of an electorate’s liberalism, or they suffered from 
other limitations.  Economists have found that tax exporting capacities and tax 
competition have significant impacts on state and local tax structures.  The tax competition 
literature presents evidence of mimicking among subnational governments for state excise 
and corporate income tax rates and for local property tax rates.  The majority of studies 
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that have examined state income and sales tax competition have found negative 
relationships, suggesting the development of tax havens within regions.  Researchers have 
consistently found that tax exporting through the deductibility of state and local taxes from 
the federal income tax is important in explaining subnational income and property tax 
levies.  The corporate income tax is the only business that has been considered in the tax 
exporting literature.  Consequently, little is known about the effects of tax exporting on 
levies that fall exclusively on businesses.  None of the studies discussed in Chapter 2 
included proxies for the benefit that a jurisdiction derives from the deductibility of state 
and local business taxes under the federal corporate and personal income taxes. 
 Chapter 3 explored the influence of average voter liberalism on state and local tax 
progressivity.  I used a measure of ideology that was developed by Berry, Ringquist, 
Fording, and Hansen (1998).  This measure has not been used in previous studies of state 
and local tax progressivity.  The measure developed by Berry et al (1998) is potentially an 
improvement over the measures used in previous studies for the following reasons: it 
varies over time and potentially captures differences in the intensity of liberalism among 
states, among other potential benefits.  I found that average voter liberalism is 
significantly and positively related to state and local tax progressivity.  However, the 
magnitude of the effect is small.  The ethnic demographic context appears to exert 
powerful influences on the progressivity of the tax structures that state and local 
governments utilize.  The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor is 
directly-related to progressivity.  The congeniality of ethnic group relations, measured 
with a residential segregation index, appears to have a negative impact.  These results 
suggest that voter preferences concerning revenue-side redistribution are substantially 
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influenced by ethnic group loyalty and by the degree of tension between ethnic groups.  
The fact that ethnic demographic characteristics have significant effects even with average 
voter liberalism held constant suggests that these variables may reflect components of 
voter preferences that are not captured by measures of general voter ideology.  This study 
is the first to examine the relationship between ethnic residential segregation and state and 
local tax progressivity.    
 Chapter 4 examined the relationship between tax exporting and state and local 
sales tax levies on business input purchases.  The taxation of business inputs may hinder 
efficiency by discouraging production in a particular state or by encouraging vertical 
integration among firms. If firms are able to pass taxes on inputs forward to consumers, 
then statutory exemptions of final consumption goods from the sales base, such as the 
exemption for groceries, may be offset.  Despite these problems, the political costs of 
taxing business input purchases may be relatively low because of low burden salience and 
also due to tax exporting opportunities.  The study did not yield evidence that the state and 
local sales taxes levied on firms are influenced by the exportability of business taxes.  I 
found evidence of an inverse relationship between the deductibility offset for personal 
taxes and producer sales tax levies, whether those levies were measured per-capita or as a 
percentage of state private sector GDP.  In states in which the offset is relatively small, 
governments may rely more heavily on producer sales taxes because of their relatively low 
salience.  Federal deductibility does not appear to significantly impact sales tax levies on 
consumer purchases.  The ethnic congruence between the poor and the non-poor is 
significantly and positively related to producer sales tax levies.  The effects are small in 
magnitude.  Voters may get more disutility from taxation in states that are ethnically 
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heterogeneous.  Consequently, governments in these states may rely more heavily on 
producer sales taxes because of their relatively low salience.  Tax competition does not 
appear to significantly affect sales tax levies on producers or consumers. 
Policy Implications 
 Empirical models of state and local tax policies can provide predictions for how 
those policies may change in response to changes in relevant demographic, political, and 
economic parameters.  Population projections developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
suggest that significant changes in the nation’s ethnic composition will occur in the 
proceeding decades.  From 2010 to 2050, the Hispanic share of the population is projected 
to rise from fifteen percent to twenty-four percent.  The effects that these changes will 
have on the ethnic similarity between the poor and the non-poor will depend on the 
upward mobility of Hispanics in the proceeding decades.  If the growth of the Hispanic 
population increases the Hispanic share of the poor population without leading to 
increases in the Hispanic share of the non-poor population that are at least equal in 
magnitude, then it may place downward pressure on popular support for progressive 
taxation. The effects may be less pronounced if tensions between ethnic groups subside. 
 The elimination of the deductibility of state and local personal taxes is periodically 
considered by federal policymakers as a means to recover revenue, enhance the equity of 
the federal income tax, and reduce the inefficiency that it engenders.  The indirect subsidy 
to state and local public spending that deductibility provides is viewed as being 
superfluous, inequitable, and inefficient by many experts.  A large fraction of state and 
local public expenditure is subsidized by the federal government through direct grant 
programs.  Deductibility confers disproportionate benefits to relatively wealthy states in 
which relatively high proportions of taxpayers itemize and face relatively high federal tax 
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rates.  It also potentially subsidizes state and local services that are not characterized by 
national spillovers.  The effects of the elimination of deductibility on the efficiency and 
equity of the combined federal, state, and local tax system would depend, in part, on the 
policy responses from state and local governments.   
 The analyses presented here suggest that the elimination of deductibility would 
lead to a significant increase in the sales tax levies on business input purchases.  These 
policy changes could lead to distortions in the allocation of capital.  As was mentioned 
above, the empirical literature suggests that the elimination of deductibility could lead to 
significant reductions in income and property tax rates which may reduce the deadweight 
losses imposed by the tax system.  The economic effects of these policy changes should be 
weighed against those of the potential increases in producer sales tax levies. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 There are key limitations to this dissertation that suggest interesting avenues for 
future research.  First, the tax incidence data utilized in Chapter 3 did not include data on 
user fees.  The research presented here could be extended by examining the effects of 
voter ideology, ethnic demographics, and tax exporting capacities on the use of fees to 
finance subnational public services such as higher education. 
 A second important limitation to this dissertation is its focus on state and local tax 
policies.  The analyses presented here do not provide insights on the effects of voter 
ideology, ethnic demographics, and tax exporting on federal tax policy. Estimates of the 
effects of shifts in these parameters on national tax systems could be obtained through 
analysis of cross-country data.  A cross-country study of the determinants of tax 
progressivity would require tax incidence data that are comparable across countries. 
 This dissertation provides limited information on the objectives that governments 
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pursue when they implement tax policies.  As was discussed in Chapter 2, the utility 
maximization, Leviathan, and probabilistic voting models all predict that governments are 
likely to take advantage of tax exporting opportunities and are likely to be responsive to 
citizen ideology and altruism to some degree.  The analyses presented here suggest that 
governments are responsive to voter preferences.  However, the results do not tell us 
whether governments choose the tax structures that maximize revenue, which is consistent 
with the Leviathan model, or if they intend to maximize expected political support, as the 
probabilistic voting model predicts, or if their primary goal is to maximize the 
representative citizen's utility.  Future research could perhaps derive testable implications 
from one of the models that is consistent with that model but not with the others.  Such 
research would improve our understanding of the efficiency of the public sector.  
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Appendix  1 
Table A.1: Data Sources 
Variable Source 
Average Tax Rate Estimates 
 Citizens for Tax Justice/Institute on Taxation and 
Economic Policy (2003); Institute on Taxation and 
Economic Policy (2009). 
Effective Sales Tax Rate on Producers 
 
Cline et al (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) 
Producer Sales Tax Levies Per-Capita 
 
Same as above. 
Effective Sales Tax Rate on Consumers 
 
Same as above. 
Consumer Sales Tax Levies Per-Capita 
 
Same as above. 
Average Voter Liberalism, Government 
Liberalism 
Richard Fording’s website: 
http://www.bama.ua.edu/~rcfording/stateideology.html 
Residential Segregation 
William H. Frey and the University of Michigan Social 
Science Data Analysis Network. 
Tax Price 
 U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 
various years; Daniel Feenberg 
Sales Activity Index 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years. 
Mining, Natural Resources, Per-Capita 
Income, Business Share 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, various years. 
Income Inequality, Number of Children 
Per Household, Ethnic Congruence, 
Marriage Rate 
Calculated by author using data from U.S. Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census; United States 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement Survey, 
various years. 
Age 65+, African American 
 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/ 
Union Density  Hirsch et al (2001)59 
Poverty Rate University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
59The estimates are updated annually at http://www.unionstats.com/. 
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Appendix  2 
 Methodology Used to Develop the Tax Burden Measures for Chapter 3 
 The tax burden estimates used here were provided by the Institute on Taxation and 
Economic Policy (2003, 2009).  The authors used samples of IRS tax returns, data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau, and other sources to estimate the personal income, general sales, 
cigarette, gasoline, beer, corporate income, and property tax burdens for samples of 
households that are representative at the state level.  The authors assumed that households 
bear the income tax burden that is levied on them and use state and local tax provisions to 
estimate the income tax burdens for each household.  Estimates of the homeowner 
property tax burden borne by itemizing homeowners were derived from IRS tax return 
data.  The burdens for non-itemizers were imputed using data from the Census and other 
sources.  Property tax relief provisions, such as “circuit breakers” were treated as 
reductions in property taxes even if actually delivered as reductions in income taxes.  
Sales tax relief provisions were handled in the same manner. 
 The authors estimated the sales tax burdens for their samples by imputing 
expenditures for numerous items and calculating the tax burdens based on those 
expenditures.  More specifically, the authors started with data from Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CES) and estimated a model of expenditure on each item from the CES data using 
demographic variables that are common to both the IRS and CES datasets.  The authors 
then used the estimated model to impute the consumption expenditures for the households 
in the sample of IRS tax returns.  The sales and excise tax burdens are estimated by 
applying state and local sales and excise tax provisions. 
 Business property and corporate income tax burdens were estimated by first 
allocating the national total business property and corporate income burden to the states in 
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relation to each state’s share of national capital income.  The authors proceeded to allocate 
a particular state’s business property and corporate income tax burden across that state’s 
income groups according to each group’s share of state capital income.  In states that 
imposed business property and corporate income taxes that were significantly above the 
national median, the authors assigned the excess to either in-state wages or in-and-out-of-
state consumption depending on the activity. 
 The authors also accounted for sales and excise taxes paid by visitors and for the 
sales and excise taxes levied on firms.  Sales and excise taxes levied on firms were divided 
into those paid by industries producing for domestic markets and those producing for 
national markets.  Taxes on domestic market items were assigned to residents of each state 
in proportion to their share of the state’s consumption expenditures on each item (amounts 
paid by visitors were subtracted from the totals).  Taxes on national market items were 
assigned to national consumption with an adjustment to reflect a portion assumed to be 
retained in-state.  These adjustment factors were adjusted downward in states where 
personal income as a share of state GDP was below the national median.  In states that 
imposed relatively high sales and excise taxes on national market activities, firms may not 
be able to pass the entire burden forward to consumers because of competitive factors.  
Because capital and labor are immobile in the short-run, portions of these taxes may be 
shifted back to wages and capital.  The authors computed total national market business 
sales and excise taxes as a share of each state’s national market GDP.  If the national 
market business tax burden was significantly above the national median, then the authors 
divided the excess evenly between in-state wages and capital.  A state’s share of this 
particular capital tax burden depends on its share of national capital.  The capital portion 
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was divided among capital owners based on each capital owner’s share of state capital 
income.   
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